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ABSTRACT
The need for accurate intelligence concerning possible terrorist attacks, spies, and
other hostile military type actions, whether it be at home or abroad, remains of critical
importance to the U.S. Intelligence Community. In this context, this paper focuses
directly on the foundational aspects of covert communication networks and how they
may be formed by groups or organizations such as al-Qaeda, jihadists, insurgents, etc.
using spy tradecraft, cryptography and the language of Modern Standard Arabic.
The paper itself is divided into two parts, one that focuses upon communicating
covertly through methods without the use of electronics, and the other with electronics.
The reason for this division is to highlight the fact that a group of individuals or an
organization may purposefully choose to use one style of covert communication over the
other in order to achieve a particular objective. For instance, electronic surveillance may
be a concern. The examples that will be given in each part are centered around
v

theoretical covert network operations conducted in the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Accompanying these examples, a useful system for
network organization is presented in order to help the reader, in this case U.S. intelligence
officials, to analyze the flow of covert communications in general. Not only does this
system demonstrate the differences between electronic and non-electronic networks, but
it also shows that with proper planning and training, the groups formerly mentioned could
possibly create intensely abstract and complicated networks in order to adapt to certain
battlefield conditions. With this said, it is the author’s suggestion to the reader to think
‘outside of the box’ when approaching the paper and to know that everything may not
always be as it appears.
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Disclaimer
The examples provided in this thesis are entirely fictitious and do not contain real
people, events, or cities. This thesis also does not encourage the formation of covert
network ideas or elements or conducting Arabic cryptography/steganography. However,
to maintain the life-like quality of the examples, the situations depicted will take place in
the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. This is more of an
attempt by the author to stay true to the terrain, infrastructure, languages, and cultures
that are exhibited in these countries. These five countries have been chosen since they
are at the top of the U.S. government’s list of countries that have played a key role in the
War on Terrorism and the war in Iraq. Most importantly, the author would like to express
his support to the U.S. government and other countries in their endeavors to fight
terrorism by showing how terrorists could possibly create covert networks in an effort to
deceive their enemies.
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Introduction
Effective intelligence depends heavily upon the study of how people interact with
one another and how well one can predict future events resulting from those interactions.
Of course, every interaction requires some degree of communication, whether it be in the
form of a phone call, courier system, email, cryptography, or just plain silence in order to
achieve a certain goal. In the context of intelligence, the purpose of this paper is to
provide a general system for the analysis and categorization of covert communication
networks by presenting the reader with the basic concepts of graph theory, simple
algorithms or procedures for cryptography and steganography, and hypothetical scenarios
of people attempting to communicate secretly in real time. All concepts and examples
presented in this paper are meant to be seen through the eyes of United States (U.S.)
intelligence officials, and for this reason, a few sections regarding cryptanalysis are
included.
The examples presented in the first part of this paper demonstrate fictional covert
non-electronic cross-border operations conducted by groups such as the Taliban, alQaeda, etc. between the countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is, communication
does not rely upon electronic devices such as cell-phones, walkie-talkies, and computers.
In contrast, the second part presents examples of long distance covert electronic networks
created by al-Qaeda and other militants in the countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
All examples incorporate cultural and geographical attributes pertaining to these selected
countries and/or the language of Modern Standard Arabic.
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Part I
Covert Non-Electronic Networks and Arabic Cryptology Applications
The Pentagon’s creation of an ultra-secret surveillance organization
known as the Intelligence Support Activity or, more simply, ‘The
Activity’… [and] its pursuit of enemy big fish failed repeatedly in
Somalia, Bosnia, and the pursuit of bin Laden as the targets learned to
avoid using vulnerable cellphones, relying on human couriers instead.
(Geraghty, 2010, pp. 52 & 66-67)
Imagine that an American spy is living in Iran and that he or she has been tasked
with the assignment to gather intelligence on Iran’s nuclear and/or long-range missile
research and development programs. Furthermore, suppose that the American spy is
posing as a Swiss banker - since he or she is in deep cover and the Swiss are neutral - and
that he or she has been given a list of the names of some Iranians who are known to have
ties to these programs. The spy has also been told that these Iranians are not particularly
fond of the Iranian regime and that they might be willing to give out information for a
price or for a chance to leave Iran with their families. Bottom line is, the spy knows that
he or she wants to contact these individuals, but he or she also knows that doing so is
extremely dangerous. That is, the American spy knows that the Iranian regime is intent
on finding traitors or Western spies by monitoring electronic communications and
through intimidation from the secret police. Some of the questions the spy might ask are:
How is he or she going to make contact with these people without getting caught? What
are some of the different ways the spy can try to maneuver around the barrier of being
2

electronically monitored to gain the right information? What are some of the specific
steps the spy can take to safeguard his or her communications, and possibly his or her
life? All of these questions relate to the field of spy tradecraft, which includes the
fundamental operative techniques used by spies to conduct successful intelligence
operations (International Spy Museum, 2011).
In the context of spy tradecraft, this part will describe a variety of ways in which
two or more people can secretly communicate with one another without using electronic
devices such as cell phones, computers, two-way radios, etc. These covert nonelectronic communication methods can include the use of couriers or messengers,
specific courier routes and destinations, drivers, dead drops, cryptography, and
steganography, to name a few. (Note that the word covert in this instance denotes an
activity that is “secret” to the controllers of communication, but in fact may be exposed to
outsiders.) These communication tactics can also rely entirely upon human physical
encounters or they can depend upon a combination of both physical encounters and
written cryptographic schemes. When covert non-electronic communication methods are
systematically combined together, they ultimately form covert non-electronic networks
(CNN) or covert non-electronic networks combined with cryptography (CNN(C)).
The main advantage of such clandestine networks is that any information exchanged
between participating parties is not subject to electronic interception as a result of poorly
secured transmissions or open electronic channels. One may also benefit strategically by
adopting these primitive types of networks when access to modern or sophisticated
technology is limited or nonexistent. However, these communication networks are not
3

without flaw. For one thing, they can be slow - and in a world of spies where network
speed might be the least of one’s worries, they can be infiltrated or observed by outsiders,
corrupted by insiders, and potentially deadly for the players of the game.
We include some examples that demonstrate how one’s enemies, such as alQaeda, the Taliban, jihadists, and insurgents, could possibly construct CNN and CNN(C)
in an attempt to adapt to certain battlefield conditions. These battlefield conditions
primarily involve, but are not limited to, these groups’ inability to access or afford
advanced technology, in addition to these groups’ awareness of U.S. military prowess
concerning electronic surveillance. These chapters will also present how covert nonelectronic methods can be manipulated, expanded, and creatively altered by other factors
(e.g., multiple couriers or cryptosystems) to perform an objective that is specific to the
particular covert network at hand. In the future, it is these structural modifications that
will be of interest when categorizing more complicated CNN/CNN(C), performing
network analysis, and/or conducting cryptanalysis. Going from the chapter of CNN to
CNN(C), it will be shown why these particular groups would want to fundamentally
modify or upgrade CNN with cryptography in order to make it harder for authorities to
gain timely and significant intelligence.
It is important to mention at this point that intelligence officials may still have the
opportunity to observe or intercept non-electronic enemy communications. For instance,
officials may use wiretapping or eavesdropping, Predator drones, and/or on-the-ground
human intelligence, to collect vital information from relevant non-electronic sources.
However, these types of networks may also impose hardships on those conducting
4

surveillance. For example, authorities observing such networks generally must be in
closer proximity to the communications, thereby increasing costs, hazards, and
manpower, associated with surveillance. The use of these types of communications by an
enemy also reduces the number of ways intelligence personnel may gather information
across vulnerable and easy-access places like the Internet.

5

Chapter 1: Covert Non-Electronic Networks (CNN)
What we’re dealing with here is potentially a global conflagration that
requires constant diligence in order to suppress. Now you see because
our enemy has realized that they are fighting guys from the future.
Now, it is brilliant as it is infuriating. If you live like it’s the past, and
you behave like it’s the past, then guys from the future find it very
hard to see you. If you throw away your cell phone, shut down your email, pass all your instructions face-to-face, hand-to-hand, turn your
back on technology, [you can] just disappear into the crowd. So what
[has] changed is that our allegedly unsophisticated enemy, has cotten
[sic] on to the factually unsophisticated truth, we’re an easy target.
(Scott, 2008)
1.1 Basic graph theory.
According to Chen (1997) in basic graph theory, an undirected graph or network
Gu(V, Eu), is formed by combining a set of elements V, called nodes, with a set of
elements Eu in V, called undirected edges. The term graph is synonymous with network.
Visually, a node is represented by a point or junction, while an undirected edge is
represented by a simple undirected line or branch (a line without an arrow). In practice,
the nodes i and j are usually connected by an undirected edge (i, j) or (j, i); here, nodes i
and j are called the endpoints of the undirected edge (i, j) or (j, i). Moreover, the
undirected edge, (i, j), is an unordered pair and it is often denoted by a letter such as e.
Note an edge may be represented by a straight line or a curved line. This option may or
6

may not hold meaning to network diagramming and must be considered by the analyst of
the network.

Figure 1. Two nodes with an undirected edge.
e
i

j

Similarly, a directed graph or network Gd(V, Ed), is formed by combining a set of
elements V, called nodes, with a set of elements Ed in V, called directed edges. Visually,
the nodes i and j are usually connected by a directed line (a line with an arrow) or
directed edge (i, j); here, the node i is called the initial node and the node j is called the
terminal node. Again, the nodes i and j are called the endpoints of the directed edge (i, j).
Moreover, the directed edge, (i, j), is an ordered pair and it is often denoted by a letter
such as e. This edge may also be represented by a straight or curved line.

Figure 2. Two nodes with a directed edge.
e
i

j

Finally, a mixed graph or network Gm(V, Em) contains both undirected and
directed edges. Some examples of these three different types of networks are presented
below.
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Figure 3. An undirected network.
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Figure 4. A directed network.
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Figure 5. A mixed network.
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1.2 Covert networks and data fields.
In this paper, we define a covert network as an undirected network Gu(V, Eu), or
more simply, G(V, E). For simplicity, we define nodes as physical locations and edges as
“connections” between locations. For example, the locations of a house and a post-office
in a particular city may be considered nodes. If a person living in that house receives a
letter from the post-office, then there is a “connection” between the two nodes. We also
say that each node contains zero or more data fields, which uniquely determine the
properties of the node. Examples of data fields include: addresses, telephone numbers,
persons of interest, descriptions of connections to other nodes, other data fields, etc.
These data fields will be helpful in terms of network organization and analysis since they
can be easily managed and written in the form of code with a computer language such as
C. This code could then be used for the development of a computer program and/or
graphical interface. For instance in a hypothetical graphical interface setting, clicking the
mouse on a particular node would reveal the data fields for edit. Newly edited node data
could then be synthesized with other node data via another computer program to produce
network data. It might also be possible to integrate the use of directed edges to show
network flow for a particular data set such as money. To save time we have not included
code, a graphical interface, or a computer program for this paper, but instead we provide
the basic framework for general covert network organization and analysis.
A particular data field may encompass other data fields. For example, the data
field of address includes the data fields of street location, zip code, country, etc. With this
said, we say that the data field of spy tradecraft includes the data fields of: type of
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espionage (e.g., military, corporate, etc.), covert communication methods, location (e.g.,
domestic or overseas), time period, etc. Of course, these spy tradecraft data fields contain
other data fields. The data fields located under the data field of covert communication
methods are the primary focus of this paper. Although we state these data fields
explicitly, the node data fields of an efficient computer program and/or graphical
interface should not be set in stone, and therefore should be left open to customization by
the software developers, analysts, and computer programmers.

10

Figure 6. The data field of spy tradecraft.
•

Spy tradecraft
• Type of espionage
• Military
• Intelligence service
• Corporate
• Covert communication methods
• Covert non-electronic communication
• Addresses or locations of interest, descriptions
• Persons of interest, couriers and contacts (time and
place of contact, profiles, courier routes, etc.)
• Drops (dead, live, timed), brush pass
• Connections to other locations
• Steganography (non-electronic)
• Cryptography (non-electronic)
• Cryptosystems
• Keys
• Ciphtertexts
• Plaintexts
• Objects/items (may be hidden or used to hide other
objects/messages)
• Written messages, verbal messages
• Covert electronic communication
• Addresses or locations of interest, descriptions
• Electronic couriers and contacts (time and place of
contact, profiles, electronic routes, etc.)
• Electronic drops (dead, live, timed)
• Connections to other locations
• Steganography (electronic)
• Cryptography (includes cryptosystems, keys,
ciphertexts, plaintexts)
• General files (e.g., Microsoft Word or Excel)
• Picture/image files, audio files
• Messages (email, text message, verbal, etc.)
• The Internet, websites
• Hardware (computers, two-way radios, etc.)
• Hybrid communication (combination of non-electronic and
electronic communication)
• Location
• Time period
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1.3 Covert non-electronic communication methods.
Some descriptions of covert non-electronic communication methods and how they
relate to the field of spy tradecraft are provided below.
A contact is a clandestine meeting between two parties or more at a particular
location. A covert non-electronic network can contain multiple contacts. According to
the International Spy Museum (2011), a cut-out is a situation in which two parties agree
to exchange information by using a specific depository or a third party contact/
intermediary, under the condition that the two parties do not meet directly during the
transaction. Examples of cut-outs include various types of drops as well as brush passes.
A dead drop is a secret depository or physical location where two parties agree to
exchange information (International Spy Museum, 2011). Both parties can choose to
interact with the dead drop site directly or they can choose to send couriers. It is also
possible to have multiple dead drop sites and couriers in order to relay a message. A live
drop is similar to a dead drop in the sense that instead of a secret depository an actual
person, such as a third party/intermediary, knowingly or unknowingly passes information
between two parties (Spytrainer, 2009). According to Antonio and Jonna Mendez (2002),
former C.I.A. operatives, a timed drop is a dead drop with a set time limit, in which the
deposited information must be retrieved before the time limit expires. Finally, a brush
pass is a timed and coordinated maneuver between two parties, in which one party
quickly and subtly hands a message to the second party in an attempt to project a
nonexistent relationship to outside observers; this maneuver is usually conducted in a
crowd or public space (Spytrainer, 2009).
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A courier or messenger is a trusted individual who is given a written message
and delivery instructions by one party, and is expected to follow through by delivering
the message to a second party or specified location. A covert non-electronic network can
consist of multiple couriers, destinations, and vested parties. Remember, couriers can be
identified and followed by outsiders, rebel against their handlers, or be an intelligence
service in disguise.
According to Cole (2003), steganography is “on the simplest level...hidden
writing, whether it consists of invisible ink on paper or copyright information hidden in
an audio file” (p. 5). We have decided to take Cole’s definition of steganography and
divide it into two subcategories, non-electronic and electronic. Non-electronic
steganography is the non-electronic component of steganography, in which writing or
information is hidden in a physical setting, such as a tattoo that can only be seen under
black-light or a message hidden in an elaborate drawing (Cole, 2003). Non-electronic
steganography may also involve transporting an item, which may seem trivial or
meaningless to an interceptor but in fact has a predetermined meaning to the receiver.
Conversely, electronic steganography is the electronic component of steganography, in
which writing or information is hidden electronically or digitally in image files, audio
files, word documents, and other types of mediums (Cole, 2003). Only non-electronic
steganography is allowed in the definition of CNN. A hybrid type of network involving
CNN and electronics, such as the physical transport of electronic and digitial
steganography on a USB flash drive, is a topic for further study and classification. The
data field of cryptography will be discussed in the next chapter.
13

1.4 Examples of CNN.
Courier: The messenger boy.
Afghanistan - Suppose that Karim and his friends are renting an inexpensive
farmhouse for their summer vacation on the outskirts of a small mountain town called
Henna near the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.
For now, Karim tells his friends that he would like to send a secret written
message to his cousin Sami, who he says lives in a small village in Pakistan just a few
miles from the border. Because the farmhouse has no internet or land-line telephone, and
none of them has brought a cell phone, computer, or two-radio, communication will be
difficult, but not impossible. To overcome this problem, Karim suggests to his friends
that they pay a young boy in town who knows the area well to deliver the written
message. Karim also says that they must instruct the boy not to tell anyone about the
message and not to reveal where the message came from if he is caught. Karim’s friends
add that they could use the same boy for all future messages, or that they could find new
and different couriers for each message; and if worse comes to worst, one of them could
deliver the message.

14

Figure 7. The messenger boy network.

loc2
loc1

Location 2 Data Fields

Location 1 Data Fields
•

•
•

Location (Country - Afghanistan,
town - Henna, description - near
Afghanistan/Pakistan border,
place - farmhouse)
Persons of interest (Karim and
friends, messenger boy)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(description - no electronics
available, messenger or courier messenger boy with written
message is sent to Karim’s cousin
Sami)

•

•
•

Location (Country - Pakistan,
town/place - a small town in
Pakistan, description - near
Afghanistan/Pakistan border)
Persons of interest (Karim’s
cousin Sami)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods (receiver
of Karim’s message from
messenger boy)

Courier: The hotel manager.
Pakistan - Meanwhile just across the border, Karim’s cousin Sami is busily
preparing to receive and host a few out-of-town business associates at his family-owned
hotel called the Fahkir Hotel. Before his business associates arrive, Sami asks his
brother-in-law and hotel manager Abdul, to deliver a secret package to his cousin Karim,
who he says is vacationing in a farmhouse not too far from the Hotel. Sami knows that
by sending the package on foot, he does not risk the chance of the package’s information
15

being electronically intercepted. Sami also assumes that the chance of the package being
physically intercepted is very low. Abdul, who is very trustworthy, quickly agrees to take
the assignment because he will get a few days off from work.
Note on couriers: These two scenarios illustrate that couriers can be random strangers,
friends, family members and/or business associates. They also show that in a covert nonelectronic network, a particular courier can be used more than once, or that there can be a
system of multiple couriers in place. In addition, these examples also demonstrate that
the secrecy of the message depends upon the trustworthiness of the courier. This can be
problematic for both sender and receiver.
Contact: Downtown Henna.
Afghanistan - Karim’s friends are leisurely sitting around the farmhouse one
afternoon when Karim enters. Karim tells his friends that he is going to visit a man
named Farooq in downtown Henna for the day to discuss some business affairs which
might be of interest to them. When he returns, Karim says that they should all have a
meeting to go over Farooq’s information.
Contact: The doorman.
Pakistan - The well-known doorman of the Fahkir Hotel, Mohammed, has just
finished unloading the luggage of some new guests, when his boss Sami approaches him
and pulls him aside. Sami asks Mohammed if he would take the afternoon off to go into
the city of Dora (which is about five minutes away) to have a secret exchange of words
with his friend Maria. Sami tells Mohammed that he is to return immediately once the
conversation has ended so that he can hear about the meeting’s details. He also tells
16

Mohammed that once they have finished their conversation, he should go back into Dora
to a place nicknamed the Stonehouse to deliver Maria’s information to a woman named
Fatima.
Dead drop: The purple plant.
Afghanistan - While sitting on the porch of the farmhouse, Karim asks his friends
if anyone has heard of a man named Alim, and if so, how does one go about contacting
him. Karim’s friend, Basil, says that he has heard of this man and that he knows how to
contact him. Basil tells Karim that he should go into the town of Henna to a place called
the Rikshire café. Here, Basil instructs Karim, he must place his message in an envelope
underneath the soil of a fake purple plant located in the back of the café near some tables.
Basil says that Alim checks the pot for new envelopes every couple of days. Basil also
adds that if Alim is told to respond to the message, Alim will place a similar looking
envelope beneath the actual pot of the same plant in exactly three days.
Live drop: The suitcase.
Pakistan - One day Sami decides that he wants to reconnect with a man named
Hanif and his associates. From past experience, Sami knows that he must place his
message inside a suitcase full of clothes and bring it to a hotel called the Imad. There,
Sami must pretend to be a guest checking out of the Hotel and he must ask the valet to
hold onto his bag for his cousin to pick up in a few hours. Sami also knows that he must
place two blue luggage tags on the suitcase so that one of Hanif’s men can recognize it
when scouting out new deliveries. The valet does not know that he is passing
information along to Hanif.
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Timed drop: The cave.
Afghanistan - Before going to bed one night, Karim orders Basil to wake up early
the following morning to deliver a small package. Furthermore, he instructs Basil to grab
the map on the kitchen table and to use it to hike up to a particular cave in the nearby
mountains. Karim says the ‘red x’ on the map signifies the cave’s location. Once he has
arrived at the cave, Basil should place the small package underneath some loose rocks
just outside the cave’s entrance. Karim also tells Basil that he must return to the cave at
noon to see if the package has been taken. In the event that it’s still there, he should bring
it back to the farmhouse.
Brush pass: The man in the black thawb.
Pakistan - Standing in the lobby of the Hotel, Sami calls for his doorman
Mohammed to come in. Sami gives a letter to Mohammed and tells him that he must
discreetly pass the letter over to a man wearing a black thawb (a black robe) in the suuq
(market) downtown. Sami emphasizes to Mohammed that he cannot stop walking when
he enters the suuq, and that the man will approach from the East in front of the Jala
Patisserie at precisely three o’clock. Failure to do so in an inconspicuous manner, Sami
adds, could be potentially dangerous.
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Chapter 2: Covert Non-Electronic Networks Combined with Cryptography
[CNN(C)]
The Vietnamese – contrary to the peasant image projected by some
Western journalists – often proved themselves superior to the U.S.
even on the arcane battlefield of electronic warfare. “The Vietcong
cryptographers learned their lessons well. While throwing an
electronic fishing net into the ether, they regularly reeled it back in
bulging with American communications, but they seldom used radios
themselves. While they listened to broadcasts from Hanoi on
inexpensive transistor radios, they sent messages back to their
commands with couriers, except in dire emergencies.” (Geraghty,
2010, p. 3)
Unlike ordinary CNN, Covert Non-Electronic Networks combined with
Cryptography (CNN(C)) look to the field of cryptography to cleverly disguise all
communications. For example, an organization might choose to encrypt the text of a
written message by using a designated cryptosystem and key before he or she gives it to a
courier. As for the cryptosystems involved, an organization could choose from a variety
of classical cryptosystems such as a shift cipher, affine cipher, or simple Vigenère cipher.
Although classical cryptosystems are not secure in general, they may be suitable for
situations in which sensitive information expires quickly and/or persons exposed to the
ciphertext are not familiar with cryptography.
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2.1 An example of a CNN(C).
Shift cipher: Blackmail.
The shift cipher is a well-known cryptosystem within the field of cryptography,
and the following example parallels the same shift cipher technique found in Trappe and
Washington (2006). However, this particular shift cipher uses Modern Standard Arabic
(MSA) as well as the author’s own set of numerical values.
Afghanistan - Karim and his friends are becoming increasingly paranoid that
some of the locals they are paying to deliver messages are passing information to outside
groups for cash rewards. This came to light when Basil said that one of the locals, who
was not one of their messengers, approached him and asked him for money for something
relating to one of their previous letters. Basil said that it essentially amounted to
blackmail. This situation, Karim notes, poses a serious threat to the privacy of their
communications, as well as to the internal workings of their organization. To overcome
this problem, Karim suggests that they start encrypting their messages. Karim also points
out that they can continue to employ the locals to deliver messages as long as their
messages are encrypted.
Karim wishes to send a message to Sami before he becomes overwhelmed with
hotel reservations during the high season. Karim’s message will notify Sami that their
friend Ibrahim has returned to Iraq. Before Karim gives his message to one of the local
messengers, he encrypts it using a shift cipher. (Note that the message will be written
down on a piece of paper and placed in an envelope.)
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For the shift cipher, Karim labels the letters of the Modern Standard Arabic
(MSA) alphabet and its special characters or modified letters with the ordered set of
integers {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 34, 35}, starting with 0 = ﺍ. Special characters are taken from
non-voweled MSA script, and we label them with integers as given in Figure 9 below.
Since the MSA alphabet is read right to left, the integers will also go right to left. The
MSA alphabet can be permuted, but for now it will be left in its original form.
Analogously, the English alphabet can be labeled with the ordered set of integers {0, 1, 2,
3…, 25}, starting with A = 0. Adding punctuation to the character set only containing the
English alphabet, one might label the question mark character ‘ ? ’ as integer 26, thereby
augmenting the set of considered integers to {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 26}. For simplicity, MSA
vowelization and punctuation marks are not considered.

Figure 8. Modern Standard Arabic alphabet (labeled with integers 0 - 27).

ﺍﺏﺕﺙﺝﺡﺥ ﺩ ﺫ ﺭ ﺯ ﺱﺵﺹ ﺽ ﻁ ﻅ ﻉ ﻍ ﻑ ﻕ ﻙ ﻝ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩ ﻭ ﻱ
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Figure 9. MSA Special characters/modified letters (labeled with integers 28 - 35).

ﺃ ﺇ ﺁ ﺀ ﺉ ﻯ ﺓ ﺅ
35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28
Karim’s message m (or plaintext) to Sami is,
. ﺭﺟﻊ ﺳﻠﻴﻢ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
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message translation:
Ibrahim returned to Iraq.
For the shift cipher, Karim uses the encryption formula,
f(x) ≡ (x + k) mod 36
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 35. The integer k is called the key.
Karim selects a secret integer k = 6 as the key, so f(x) ≡ (x + 6) mod 36.

Figure 10. Shift cipher encryption.
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ﻉ
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ﺭ
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ﺙ

ﺃ

ﺅ

ﺇ

ﻯ

ﺃ

ﻉ

ﻡ

ﺯ

ﻁ

ciphertext

ﻕ

ﺍ

ﺭ

ﻉ

ﻝ

ﺍ

plaintext

20

0

9

17

22

0

x

26

6

15

23

28

6

f(x)

ﻭ

ﺥ

ﻁ

ﻡ

ﺃ

ﺥ

ciphertext

Karim’s ciphertext and encrypted message is,

ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ
Note: The encrypted message in connected letter form is  ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ,while the
same encrypted message in disconnected letter form is ﻁ ﺯ ﻡ ﻉ ﺃ ﻯ ﺇ ﺅ ﺃ ﺙ ﺥ ﺃ ﻡ ﻁ ﺥ ﻭ.
These versions are identical except that there are spaces between the letters in the
disconnected form. Letters with naturally occurring spaces in the connected letter form
cannot be joined together, since they are not defined in MSA. These extra spaces,
whether they occur in the connected or disconnected forms, are ignored for simplicity
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throughout the paper during both the encryption and decryption processes. Sentence form
is identical to the connected and disconnected forms, except that sentence form combines
correctly ordered letter combinations to form words. As another example, take the
plaintext sentence form message above and give all 3 forms.
sentence form: ﺭﺟﻊ ﺳﻠﻴﻢ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
connected letter form: ﺭﺟﻌﺴﻠﻴﻤﺈﻟﻰﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ
disconnected letter form: ﺭ ﺝ ﻉ ﺱ ﻝ ﻱ ﻡ ﺇ ﻝ ﻯ ﺍ ﻝ ﻉ ﺭ ﺍ ﻕ
Of course, ciphertext sentence form is probably meaningless and nonexistent as the above
example demonstrates (see )ﻃﺰﻣﻌﺄﻯﺇﺅﺃﺛﺨﺄﻣﻄﺨﻮ
Karim puts his message in an envelope and gives it to the messenger.
decryption formula derivation:
f(x) ≡ (x + 6) mod 36
f(x) - 6 ≡ x mod 36
x ≡ (f(x) - 6) mod 36
2.2 Complete communication for CNN(C).
An important question is, how will Sami know how to decrypt Karim’s message
m using the formula x ≡ (f(x) - k) mod 36 and the key k = 6? With this question in mind,
if Sami later receives only the formula from Karim (delivered perhaps by a different
courier through a separate message), he will be able to search through all the possible
keys to obtain Karim’s original message, though this may take a while. If on the other
hand, Sami receives both the formula and the key (again delivered by a separate courier),
then decryption will not be difficult. And if Sami just receives the key, then he will not
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know what cryptosystem is being used for the ciphertext, which will make decryption
somewhat difficult, especially if the ciphertext is short and/or a modern day cryptosystem
is involved. This is where the art of ciphertext/cryptosystem sharing and key passing
techniques comes into play. The term art is used here because there are an infinite
number of creative ways in which one can covertly deliver ciphertexts, cryptosystems
and keys to a receiving party. The term complete communication in a CNN(C) is used
to describe a situation, in which all corresponding ciphertext(s), cryptosystem(s) and/or
key(s) for a given plaintext are delivered on time to their correct destinations, under the
condition that the delivery of these items to their destinations is synchronized in a way by
the controllers of the network to allow for the successful decryption of the ciphertext(s).
For this reason, we divide the data field of cryptography into four new fields: keys,
plaintexts, ciphertexts, and cryptosystems.
Ciphertext/cryptosystem passing or sharing is a method in which one delivers
a ciphertext/cryptosystem to another party through the use of couriers, contacts, cell
phones, computers, etc. Like ciphertext/cryptosystem sharing, key passing or sharing is
a method in which one delivers the keys of a ciphertext/cryptosystem to another party
using one of the methods mentioned above. For now, we will only focus on ciphertext
and key passing techniques in a non-electronic setting.
Ciphertext sharing and key passing are equally important for the receiver, since
they depend upon one another. For example, a ciphertext without a key is useless to a
receiving party, since the ciphertext is meant to be viewed anyway (though this ciphertext
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might be extremely valuable to an outside observer). With this said, it is best to keep the
ciphertext delivery completely separated from the delivery of the key.
2.3 Modern Standard Arabic language statistics.
Frequency analysis.
The following statistical data on the frequencies of the Modern Standard Arabic
alphabet and its special characters was computed by a Canadian software company called
Intellaren. Intellaren (2012) specializes in multilingual software solutions and has
produced software products such as Intellyze, which is an Arabic letter and word
frequency analyzer.
In order to calculate the letter frequencies of MSA, Intellaren (2012) used its
software to conduct an experiment on four different input sources (see below). For the
experiment, their software counted the number of times each character of the MSA
alphabet and its special characters appeared in each source, while omitting spaces,
punctuation, and vowelization. The frequency count data is separated into two
categories; one category for Source 1 (The Quran )ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥ, the second, a combination of
Sources 2-4.
Four original input sources (Intellaren, 2012).
Source 1: The Quran ( ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺁﻥtotal number of letters: 330,709)
Source 2: The first seven volumes of the series ( ﺍﻟﺒﺪﺍﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔThe Beginning and The
End) by Ibn Katheer (total number of letters: 4,326,031)
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Source 3: The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet  ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻖ ﺍﳌﺨﺘﻮﻡby ArRaheeq Al-Makhtum (total number of letters: 553,740)
Source 4: The Masterpiece of the Brides  ﲢﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﻭﺳﲔby Al-shuri (total number of
letters: 242,361 letters)
Combined Total: 5,452,841 letters
Combining the data for the four original input sources.
There are a variety of valid arguments for using different data combinations of the
four original input sources (or other input sources), or perhaps leaving each data input
source on its own, for the use of particular topics. Some of these arguments hold more
value than others in topics such as language, religion, culture, or statistics. For instance,
if one is analyzing Middle Eastern religious texts, one would likely want to stay focused
on The Quran data or other dialects pertaining to archaeological sites. Furthermore, since
The Quran is a religious text it may skew the statistical properties of other less religious
text data. This is due to the fact that The Quran is more prone to repeating certain
religious words and phrases, and consequently, its data could potentially statistically alter
the data of purely nonreligious material. Religious and specific dialect data may also
hold value if one is analyzing codes from ideological or religious websites in a particular
region or country. As for statistical purposes, an organization or company may want to
collect data on all Arabic dialects, words, and characters from the vast sea of the Internet
for marketing research, business intelligence, and government intelligence. Another
perhaps very subtle reason for combining religious and multiple dialect data, is that the
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religious influence of Islam is almost at a constant in the Arab world in terms of language
and can be seen and heard in most daily life activities.
The data for the four original input sources have been combined by the author in
order to reflect the combination of the topics of religious influence in the Arab world and
the specific dialect of Modern Standard Arabic. Therefore, the author states that these
data are statistically relevant to this combination of topics and to this specific
combination of topics only. In terms of cryptanalysis, one could potentially benefit from
this statistical data if the background of ciphertext warrants this reflection.

Figure 11. Letter frequencies and relative frequencies of the Modern Standard Arabic
alphabet and its special characters.
x

Frequency Relative Frequency

x

Frequency Relative Frequency

ﺍ

683,904

.125422

ﻍ

17,914

.003285

ﺏ

250,553

.045949

ﻑ

154,034

.028248

ﺕ

144,017

.026411

ﻕ

144,837

.026562

ﺙ

46,097

.008454

ﻙ

114,900

.021072

ﺝ

66,217

.012144

ﻝ

656,656

.120425

ﺡ

99,614

.018268

ﻡ

360,593

.066129

ﺥ

43,032

.007892

ﻥ

365,916

.067106

ﺩ

142,488

.026131

ﻩ

274,960

.050425

ﺫ

53,998

.009903

ﻭ

321,877

.059029

ﺭ

227,689

.041756

ﻱ

347,804

.063784

ﺯ

28,378

.005204

ﺃ

156,998

.028792

ﺱ

132,282

.024259

ﺇ

56,141

.010296

ﺵ

39,730

.007286

ﺁ

9,003

.001651
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ﺹ

55,301

.010142

ﺀ

17,510

.003211

ﺽ

24,326

.004461

ﺉ

15,572

.002856

ﻁ

26,695

.004896

ﻯ

68,656

.012591

ﻅ

9,812

.001799

ﺓ

75,296

.013809

ﻉ

214,996

.039428

ﺅ

5,045

.000925

Total: 5,452,841
Note: Relative Frequency = Frequency/Total. For example, 683,904/5,452,841= .125422

Figure 12. MSA character probability
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Interpretation of MSA letter frequency data.
It is quite obvious from the data that the two most frequent occurring letters in the
MSA alphabet are “  ” ﺍand “ ” ﻝ. This is due to the fact that the particular digram
combination of the two letters, “  ” ﺍﻝ, is the definite article for MSA, which is the U.S.
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English equivalent of the word “the”, such as “the apple” or “the scooter.” The indefinite
articles for U.S. English are represented by the words “a” and “an”, for example, “an
apple” or “a book.” In MSA, indefiniteness is signified by the removal of “  ” ﺍﻝfollowed
by nunation, which is given by the nunation case markers ً ، ٍ ، ٌ (Abboud & McCarus,
1983, pp. 110-112). This nunation was not considered in the four original input sources
since it is a part of vowelization.
2.4 Additional examples of CNN(C).
Affine cipher: The foreign students.
The affine cipher is a well-known cryptosystem within the field of cryptography
and the following example parallels the same affine cipher found in Trappe and
Washington (2006). Again, this particular affine cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s
own set of numerical values.
Pakistan - Receiving news that some of Karim’s local messengers might be
corrupt, Sami issues an order to his staff that all messages leaving the Hotel must be
encrypted.
Sami would like to send another message to his friend Maria in Dora telling her
about some of the foreign students he has met over the last few weeks at one of the
private universities. Sami encrypts his message using an affine cipher and gives it to his
doorman Mohammed for delivery.
For the affine cipher, Sami labels the letters of the MSA alphabet and special
characters with the same integer values as in Figures 8 and 9.
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Sami’s message m to Maria is,
message m:

 ﺃﻣﺎ،ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺖ ﻋﺪﺩﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﻼﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺭﻳﲔ ﻭ ﺍﳌﺼﺮﻳﲔ
. ﺍﻟﻄﻼﺏ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻳﺘﻴﻮﻥ ﻓﻠﻢ ﺍﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﺍﺣﺪﺍ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺣﺘﻰ ﺍﻻﻥ
message translation:
“I met a number of Syrian and Egyptian students. As for the Kuwaiti students,
I haven’t met one of them so far” (Abboud & McCarus, 1983, p. 206).
For the affine cipher, Sami uses the encryption formula (affine function),
f(x) ≡ (αx + β) mod 36
where gcd(α, 36) = 1 and β is an integer from the set {0, 1, . . . , 35}.
Sami selects α = 29 and β = 35 as the key and writes it as an ordered pair (α, β).
So in this case, the key is (29, 35) and f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36. Sami also makes sure
that the greatest common divisor of 29 and 36 is equal to one or gcd(29, 36) = 1. This
property means that 29 and 36 are relatively prime and it guarantees that there exists an
inverse for 29 modulo 36, and hence an inverse for the affine function.

Figure 13. Affine cipher encryption.
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(29x + 35) mod
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ciphertext

ﺅ ﻍ ﺱ ﺝ ﻍ

ﻝ

ﺍ

ﺅ

ﻩ

ﺃ

ﻩ ﻍ ﺅ ﺙ ﺅ

ﺱ ﺯ

ﺡ ﺕ ﻯ ﺍ ﻝ ﺍ ﻥ

plaintext
x
(29x + 35) mod
36

24 0 22 0 33 2

5

11 35 25 35 20 21 0

ﺅ ﺱ

ciphertext

ﻩ

ﻙ ﻕ ﺅ

ﺍ

ciphertext:

ﺛﺆﺃﻫﻜﻨﻠﻠﺆﻏﺴﺆﻫﺘﻬﺆﺃﺅﻫﺂﻯﺫﻭﻭﺳﻰﺅﻫﻐﻈﺬﻭﻭﺳﻔﻐﺆﺅﻫﺘﻬﺆﺃﺅﻫﺌﻰﻭﻛﻮﻯﺳﺰﻫﻐﺆﺛﺆﺃﻫﺆﺍﻟﺆﻏﺴﺠﻐﺎﻛﻘﺆﻫﺆﺱ
decryption formula derivation:
f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36
f(x) ≡ (29x + 35) mod 36
f(x) - 35 ≡ (29x) mod 36
-1

29 (f(x) - 35) ≡ x mod 36
5(f(x) - 35) ≡ x mod 36
(5f(x) - 31) mod 36 ≡ x
This message is given to Mohammed for delivery. In order for Maria to decrypt the
ciphertext, she will need the corresponding key and cryptosystem decryption formula,
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which are (29, 35) and (5y - 31) mod 36 ≡ x, respectively. In this case, Sami will assign a
new courier to deliver these items to Maria in three days.
Playfair cipher: The Pakistani government.
The Playfair cipher is a classical cryptosystem within the field of cryptography
and the following example parallels the same Playfair cipher found in Trappe and
Washington (2006). Again, this particular Playfair cipher uses MSA.
Afghanistan - Karim receives a letter from Sami asking if it is safe for their group
to conduct operations in one particular area of the region without interference from the
Pakistani government. Karim decides to encrypt his message using the Playfair cipher.
For the Playfair cipher, Karim chooses a word for the key.
Karim chooses the word,

ﻧﻘﻮﺩ
translation:
cash, money; coins

Having selected a key, Karim places his word in the first row of a 6 x 6 matrix and fills in
the remaining spaces with the remaining letters of the alphabet (and special characters).
If a letter is repeated in the key, one of the letters is omitted. Karim’s key is in purple.
Karim’s matrix is therefore,

ﺏ

ﺍ

ﺩ

ﻭ

ﻕ

ﻥ

ﺫ

ﺥ

ﺡ

ﺝ

ﺙ

ﺕ

ﺱ ﺵ ﺹ ﺽ

ﺯ

ﺭ

ﻙ

ﻅ

ﻁ

ﻑ

ﻍ

ﻉ
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ﺇ

ﺃ

ﻱ

ﻩ

ﻡ

ﻝ

ﺅ

ﺓ

ﻯ

ﺉ

ﺀ

ﺁ

Karim’s message is,

ﻻ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﺍﳊﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﻷﺻﺪﻗﺎﺋﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻻﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻃﻮﻳﻼ
general message translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
The government does not permit our friends to stay there long.
Karim breaks his message into blocks of size 2 and adds an extra  ﺏin the last
block. This extra letter is chosen at random from the alphabet in order to complete a
block of size 2.

Figure 14. Playfair cipher encryption.

 ﻝ ﺍ ﺕ ﺱ ﻡ ﺡ ﺍ ﻝ ﺡ ﻙ ﻭ ﻡ ﺓ ﻝ ﺃ ﺹ ﺩ ﻕ ﺍ ﺉ ﻥ ﺍ ﺏ ﺍ ﻝ ﺍ ﻕ ﺍplaintext
 ﺃ ﻥ ﺝ ﺭ ﻱ ﺙ ﻥ ﺃ ﺫ ﻍ ﻕ ﻩ ﺁ ﺃ ﺓ ﻑ ﻭ ﻥ ﻭ ﺓ ﺏ ﺩ ﺍ ﺩ ﺃ ﻥ ﻥ ﺩciphertext
 ﻡ ﺓ ﻩ ﻥ ﺍ ﻙ ﻁ ﻭ ﻱ ﻝ ﺍ ﺏplaintext
ﺩﺍ

ﻝﻭ ﺏﻑ ﻉﻥ ﻩﺇ

 ﺃ ﺀciphertext

Using his matrix, Karim derives the ciphertext from the following rules taken from
Trappe and Washington (2006):
1.

Letters that are not in the same row or column are replaced by the letters that are
in the row and the column of the other letter.
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2.

Letters that are in the same row are replaced by the letters to the right with the
row continuously wrapping around the matrix.

3.

Letters that are in the same column are replaced with the letters below with the
column continuously wrapping around the matrix.
ciphertext:

ﺃﻥﺝﺭﻱﺙﻥﺃﺫﻍﻕﻩﺁﺃﺓﻑﻭﻥﻭﺓﺏﺩﺍﺩﺃﻥﻥﺩﺃﺀﻝﻭﺏﻑﻉﻥﻩﺇﺩﺍ
Karim then sends the key and the ciphertext to Sami separately. Karim sends the
key with a messenger to a particular dead drop site, whereby another messenger picks up
the key and delivers it to Sami. This dead drop method is repeated with a different
location and with different messengers for the ciphertext. The ciphertext is always
delivered three days after the delivery of the key.
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Figure 15. The Pakistani government network.

loc4

loc2
loc1
loc3

Location 2 Data Fields

Location 1 Data Fields
•

•

•

Location (Country - Afghanistan,
town - Henna, description - near
Afghanistan/Pakistan border,
place - farmhouse)
Persons of interest (Karim and
friends, two messengers unknown)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(description - no electronics
available, two different
messengers deliver key and
ciphertext to two different dead
drop sites, cryptography - Playfair
cipher - key and ciphertext)
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•

•
•

Location (Town/place - unknown,
description - near Afghanistan/
Pakistan border)
Persons of interest (two
messengers - unknown)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(ciphertext exchange at dead drop
site)

Location 4 Data Fields

Location 3 Data Fields
•

•
•

Location (Town/place - unknown,
description - near Afghanistan/
Pakistan border)
Persons of interest (two
messengers - unknown)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods (key
exchange at dead drop site)

•

•

•

Location (Country - Pakistan,
town/place - a small town in
Pakistan, description - near
Afghanistan/Pakistan border)
Persons of interest (Karim’s
cousin Sami, two messengers unknown)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods (two
different messengers pick up key
and ciphterext from two different
dead drop sites and deliver them
to Sami, cryptography - Playfair
cipher - key and ciphertext)

The Vigenère cipher: The ghost.
The Vigenère cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example
parallels the same Vigenère cipher method for encryption found in Trappe and
Washtington (2006). Again, this particular cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s own
set of numerical values.
Pakistan - Sami would like to inform Karim about his recent trip to the university.
Moreover, he would like to notify Karim that he had a meeting with the university’s
president and that the president received a letter from a very important man who goes by
the alias of the Ghost. Sami decides to encrypt his message using the Vigenère cipher
(ignoring spaces and punctuation).
Sami’s message m is,

⋅ ﻭﺻﻞ ﺭﺋﻴﺲ ﺍﳉﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻭ ﻫﻮ ﻳﺤﻤﻞ ﺭﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻫﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺢ
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⋅ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺢ ﺩﻣﺸﻖ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﺒﺎﺡ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺀ
ﺍﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ:
ﲢﺎﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻻﻧﺤﻴﺎﺯ
⋅ ﻭ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻣﻨﺤﺎﺯﺓ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻕ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺏ
general translation of message m:
The president of the university arrived while carrying an important letter from the
Ghost. If the Ghost leaves Damascus in the morning he will be here before the evening.
The letter:
Pakistan tries to follow a policy of non-alignment; that means it is not aligned
with either the East or the West (Abboud & McCarus, 1983).
For the Vigenère cipher, Sami chooses a vector v of length k for the encryption
key. In this case, Sami chooses an Arabic keyword for the vector, since the word can be
broken down numerically and it can be easily remembered. Sami chooses the Arabic
keyword,

ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ
which means,
election
The length of the vector is 6, since the Arabic word has 6 letters. Figures 8 and 9 give the
corresponding vector v = (1, 0, 6, 2, 24, 0). Remember, the entries of the vector are read
right to left, as are the letters in the Arabic word.
1 0 6 2 24 0 ← ﺍ ﻥ ﺕ ﺥ ﺍ ﺏ
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To encrypt his message, Sami repeatedly writes the vector below the plaintext and shifts
each letter of the plaintext by the amount given in the corresponding vector entry (mod
36), hence the Vigenère cipher contains multiple shift ciphers.

Figure 16. Vigenère cipher encryption.
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The line numbers in red are for cryptanalysis reference later.
Sami puts his ciphertext in an envelope and gives it to a courier. He also sends
the secret keyword and Arabic Vigenère square with another courier, who is told to take a
different route.
The Vigenère cipher: Cryptanalysis.
In order to analyze the Vigenère Cipher we need five things:
1. Kasiski’s method
2. The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters
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3. The measure of roughness
4. The index of coincidence
5. The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t
Kasiski’s method.
Kasiski’s method is a cryptanalysis technique that helps determine the number of
alphabets t of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher. Moreover, the value t represents the
length of the unknown keyword, which is sometimes described as the number of
monoalphabetic substitutions or shifts resulting from each individual letter of the
keyword, hence the term polyalphabetic substitution. Kasiski’s method is based on the
idea that identical portions of plaintext encrypted with identical portions of the keyword
produce identical portions of ciphertext (Menezes, van Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1997).
With this said, it is then hypothesized that the number of characters between the initial
starting points of identical portions of ciphertext is a multiple of the number of the
alphabets or keyword length t. Once a list of the possible number of alphabets or
keyword length t is established, a statistical comparison of all individual ciphertext
alphabets for each set value of t is made to the inherent properties of one particular source
language alphabet. Note, if all individual ciphertext alphabets contain identical
characters to this particular source language alphabet, then the cipher is classified as a
simple Vigenère cipher. Furthermore, each ciphertext alphabet is a shift cipher of this
original source language alphabet. If the characters of the individual ciphertext alphabets
differ from the characters of the original source language alphabet, the statistical
properties of each ciphertext alphabet will still reflect the original properties of the source
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language. This is due to simple substitution, however; the cipher is not classified as a
simple Vigenère cipher.
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters.
If the ciphertext is short, it is best to count the frequency of each character by
hand. If the ciphertext is long, it may be better to use software to count the frequency of
each character.
The measure of roughness.
The measure of roughness is a quantity that measures the deviation of plaintext
(author’s emphasis) character relative frequencies from a uniform frequency distribution
(UFD) for a given source language (Menezes et al., 1997). The measure of roughness is
defined as follows,

where n equals the number of distinct characters of the plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . ,
a1, a0} from the source language, and pi are the corresponding character relative
frequencies. Hence, the measure of roughness can be quantified for any source language
with plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . , a1, a0}. The term plaintext alphabet may be
substituted by the term plaintext character set. In practice, it would be wise to use
software such as Intellyze (see Figure 11), to estimate the character relative frequencies pi
of the plaintext alphabet from a large data set containing the source language. This is due
to the fact that character relative frequencies from a small source, say a handwritten
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message, do not accurately reflect the overall structure of character relative frequencies
for an entire source language.
To derive the MR we expand the expression below,

We can find the minimum value for the MR of the source language by looking at
its value for a UFD. For a UFD, every character ai of the plaintext alphabet occurs with
equal probability pi = (1/n), therefore min(MR) = 0. A maximum value for the MR
occurs when the plaintext character relative frequencies pi of the source language are
present (Menezes et al., 1997). Note, however, that this maximum value is an
approximation, since it is based on previously estimated character relative frequencies pi.
This is given by max(MR) = ∑pi2 - (1/n) = kp - (1/n), where kp = ∑pi2 is called the
roughness constant of the source language. The roughness constant kp = ∑pi2 is the
probability that two randomly chosen characters from the plaintext alphabet of source
language are in fact equal. This is quite obvious since encryption of the source language
is not present.
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The index of coincidence.
The index of coincidence (IC) is a quantity that measures the variation in
ciphertext (author’s emphasis) character frequencies for a given ciphertext (Pieprzyk,
Hardjono, & Seberry, 2003). The formula for the index of coincidence is,

where L is the length of the ciphertext, and fi is the frequency of letter bi in the ciphertext
alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} (Menezes et al., 1997). The term ciphertext alphabet
may be substituted by the term ciphertext character set. Also note, that unlike the MR,
character frequencies are used instead of character relative frequencies.
Given a ciphertext of length L, the binomial coefficient

represents the

number of distinct character groups of size 2 that can be selected from the ciphertext
when order of selection is not considered relevant (Ross, 2010). Similarly, given a
particular ciphertext character bi with frequency fi, the binomial coefficient
represents the number of distinct groups of size 2 that can be selected from the character
group bi when order of selection is not considered relevant. Therefore, the IC is the
probability that a pair of identical ciphertext characters (bi, bi) from the ciphertext
alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} with corresponding frequency fi, are the same for a
given ciphertext of length L.
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The IC is a direct estimate of the source language roughness constant, kp = ∑pi2
(Menezes et al., 1997), given that the ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} and
plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . . . , a1, a0} are statistically identical. For instance, in
simple substitution, an augmented version of an English ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . .
. , b1, b0} = {1, 2, 3, . . . , c, b, a} may represent the MSA plaintext alphabet {an-1, an-2, . .
. , a2, a1, a0} = { ﺅ، ﺓ، . . . ، ﺕ، ﺏ،}ﺍ. This would be accomplished by substituting the
first letter of the MSA alphabet with the first letter of the English alphabet, the second
letter of MSA with the second letter of English, and so on. English numbers would
replace the remaining MSA plaintext letters. Although, a random ciphertext sample of
length L with character frequencies fi would appear as English, it would statistically
exhibit the MSA source language with plaintext character relative frequencies pi. This is
due to the fact that as L increases for the sample English ciphertext, fi/L ≈ pi. For now,
we will assume that the character set of the ciphertext alphabet is identical to the
character set of the plaintext alphabet. As mentioned earlier, it would be wise to estimate
the plaintext character relative frequencies pi of the source language with software.
Proof (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).
Substituting fi ≈ L ⋅ pi into the formula for the IC above we get,

Letting L go to infinity, we get IC ≈ ∑pi2. Therefore, the IC approximates the
roughness constant kp = ∑pi2 of the source language.
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The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t.
For each ciphertext alphabet, compare its corresponding index of coincidence to
the roughness constant of the source language.
Applying cryptanalysis to the ghost.
Statistically speaking, we assume that the ciphertext reflects the combination of
the topics of religion and the MSA dialect.
Kasiski’s method.
Looking at the ciphertext on p. 41, we notice that lines 4 and 5 both contain the
trigram “ ” ﻥ ﺥ ﻝ. The number of characters between the initial starting points “  ” ﻥof
these two trigrams (making sure not to double count) is 18. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the number of alphabets or keyword length t is either 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, or 18.
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters.
The frequency distribution of single ciphertext characters is directly computed
from the ciphertext and its letter frequencies found on p. 41.

Figure 17. Ciphertext frequency distribution.
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The measure of roughness.
For the source language of MSA, there exists 36 distinct characters in the
plaintext nonvowelized character set. This plaintext character set is given by {an-1, an-2, .
. . , a2, a1, a0} = { ﺅ، ﺓ، . . . ، ﺕ، ﺏ،}ﺍ, where n = 36 and 35 ≥ i ≥ 0. Using the plaintext
character relative frequencies from Figure 11 we can approximate the roughness constant
kp for MSA. For kp we get,

kp =

= (.000925)2 + (.013809)2 + (.012591)2 + . . . + (.125422)2
= 0.0608

Therefore, max(MR) = kp - (1/n) ≈ 0.0608 - (1/36) = 0.0330, is an approximate
maximum for the MR of MSA. The minimum value of the MR is taken from the UFD.
0.0 ≤ MR ≤ 0.0330
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The MR relates to the index of coincidence, which is described below.
The index of coincidence.
Since IC ≈ ∑pi2 = kp, we can find approximate lower and upper bounds for the IC
of MSA. Since IC ≈ ∑pi2

= kp = MR + 1/n and 0.0 ≤ MR ≤ 0.0330, we know that

0 + 1/n ≤ MR + 1/n ≤ 0.0330 + 1/n. Here, 1/n = 1/36 = .0278.
For MSA they are,
0.0278 ≤ IC ≤ 0.0608
For MSA cryptanalysis involving simple substitution or shifts, we are only
concerned with ciphertext alphabets that have an IC value gravitating towards the upper
bound value of 0.0608. This is due to the fact that this value represents the roughness
constant kp of MSA, and is therefore a strong indicator that a particular ciphertext
alphabet exhibits the same statistical properties of the previously computed MSA
character relative frequencies pi.
It appears that the Internet only gives one source on the index of coincidence for
Arabic; which specific dialect of Arabic this is for is not mentioned (note, English
sources only). The value is presently stated as IC = 0.075889 (3/1/2012). This author
contacted J. Seberry, a well-known cryptographer and computer scientist and an author of
Fundamentals of Computer Security (2003). Her reply confirmed that this value is
incorrect and that there was an error in the original data (personal communication, May 8,
2011; see Appendix A).
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The monoalphabetic indices of coincidence for a set value of t.
In practice, software should be used to compare the indices of coincidence for all
ciphertext alphabets for all values of t to the roughness constant kp of MSA. To save
time, we assume t = 6 for the number of alphabets or keyword length and divide the
ciphertext accordingly into 6 monoalphabetic groups (Pieprzyk et al., 2003). These
monoalphabetic groups are formed by individual character positions within the
ciphertext. The total length of the ciphertext is L = 156, therefore the first
monoalphabetic group is given by character positions 6i, where i = 0, 1, 2, . . . 25, since
L/6 = 156/6 = 26. The second group is given by character positions 6i + 1, where i = 0, 1,
2, . . . 25, and so on. We then compose a separate ciphertext frequency distribution for
each monoalphabetic group and compute its index of coincidence.

Figure 18. Monoalphabetic indices of coincidence.
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0

0

0

0

0

0

ﺙ

0

0

1

2

0

0

ﺝ

0

0

0

0

0

3

ﺡ

4

0

5

0

0

0

ﺥ

0

0

1

0

0

2

ﺩ

0

0

2

0

0

1

ﺫ

0

1

0

0

1

0

ﺭ

2

0

1

1

2

0

ﺯ

0

1

0

0

3

4

ﺱ

0

1

0

0

2

0

ﺵ

0

0

0

1

0

0

ﺹ

0

0

0

2

1

0

ﺽ

0

0

3

1

2

0

ﻁ
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0

0

1

0

1

0

ﻅ

0

0

1

0

1

1

ﻉ

2

0

1

0

0

0

ﻍ

0

1

0

0

0

0

ﻑ

0

1

0

0

0

1

ﻕ

0

0

0

0

0

2

ﻙ

0

4

0

0

2

1

ﻝ

1

1

1

0

0

1

ﻡ

2

3

1

8

7

0

ﻥ

2

0

0

1

1

1

ﻩ

1

2

1

2

0

2

ﻭ

0

0

0

1

0

1

ﻱ

3

0

2

1

0

1

ﺃ

1

0

1

0

0

0

ﺇ

0

0

0

0

0

0

ﺁ

0

0

3

0

0

0

ﺀ

0

1

0

0

0

0

ﺉ

0

0

0

1

0

0

ﻯ

1

1

0

0

1

0

ﺓ

1

0

1

0

1

0

ﺅ

.0477

0.0677

0.0554

0.1138

0.0862

0.0677

IC

By comparing the respective index of coincidence of each group to the MSA
roughness constant kp = ∑pi2= 0.0608, the IC gives an approximate measure of how close
the ciphertext frequency distribution is to the MSA plaintext frequency distribution. With
this said, we look at groups 1 and 5 since they both have an IC value of 0.0677, which is
close to 0.0608. The most frequently occurring letter in these two groups is “ ” ﺍ, so we
assume “  ” ﺍis part of the overall keyword for positions 1 and 5. Why? The nice thing
about MSA is that the most frequently occurring letter in the alphabet is the first letter of
alphabet, which is “ ” ﺍ. This means that the most frequently occurring letter in a simple
substitution ciphertext should not only reveal the number of shifts, but also the actual
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letter of the shift. This property of MSA is called the alif property of simple
substitution, since the letter “  ” ﺍis pronounced alif. This is different from U.S. English,
where e is the most common letter. This is demonstrated below for a shift by “  ” ﺙfor
MSA and a shift “ i ” for American English.
MSA:

ﺙ=ﺙ+ﺍ
3 = (3 + 0) mod 36
3=ﺙ
American English:
e+i=m
(4 + 8) mod 26 =12
12 = m
Now looking at the IC values for groups 2 and 4, we can see that they are not far
off from 0.0608. The most frequent letter in group 2 is “ ” ﻥ, so by the alif property, the
second letter of the keyword is “ ” ﻥ. Next, for group 4, the most frequent letter is “ ”ﺥ,
so again by the alif property, “  ”ﺥis the fourth letter of the keyword. For group 3, the
most common letter is “ ” ﻥ, but in MSA, two consonants such as “  ” ﻥcannot occur in a
row, and since we have decided “  ” ﻥis keyword letter for group 2 we must choose a
different letter. The next most common letter in group 3 is “ ” ﺕ, so this will be our
choice for the third letter of the keyword. For groups, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, our keyword is,

ﺍﻥﺕﺥﺍـ
Guessing “  ” ﺏfor the last letter of the key in group 6 we find that the keyword is,

ﺍﻥﺕﺥﺍﺏ
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or,

ﺍﻧﺘﺨﺎﺏ
which translates to “elections”.
The expected value of the index of coincidence.
Remember, the IC is the probability that a pair of identical ciphertext characters
(bi, bi) from the ciphertext alphabet {bn-1, bn-2, . . . , b1, b0} with corresponding
frequency fi, are the same for a given ciphertext of length L. Letting T be the number of
alphabets t of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, the probability mass function for the
index of coincidence with T alphabets is defined as follows:
P[T = 1] = simple substitution, 1 alphabet, or kp such that kp = ∑pi2 is the
roughness constant of the source language.
P[T = 2] = 2 alphabets
...
P[T = ∞] = kr = 1/n, where T is said to have an infinite number of alphabets t or an
infinite period (Pieprzyk et al., 2003). This statement is equivalent to saying that
every character of the source language has equal probability.
The expected value for the index of coincidence of a polyalphabetic substitution
cipher of t alphabets is given by,

where L is the length of the ciphertext, kp is defined as the roughness constant of the
source language, and kr = 1/n, where n is the size of the source language alphabet
(Menezes et al., 1997). Many Internet sources and books claim that by tabulating values
52

of t with corresponding IC expected values, one can derive the number of alphabets t of
the ciphertext by comparing these expected values to the IC of the source language (see.
Menezes et al., 1997 pp. 249 -250). However, this formula is statistical in nature and can
give misleading results (Pieprzyk et al., 2003).
2.5 Hidden objects.
Hidden objects: Flashlight.
Pakistan - Sami and his friend Mohammed come up with a new way to exchange
secret messages or codes in order to plan their next meeting. The new plan involves
writing a secret message or code on a small piece of plastic from an index card and then
hiding it inside a flashlight. The flashlight is then given to a courier or intermediary, who
will deliver it to either Sami or Mohammed, hence resulting in two-way communication.
Sami writes the Arabic word for the market “  ” ﺍﻟﺴﻮﻕwith a dry-erase marker on the
piece of plastic and inserts it into the flashlight (the plastic insert and dry-erase marker
allows for re-use of the cryptosystem). The figures below depict this process:

Figure 19. First step of hiding process.
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Figure 20. Second step of hiding process.

Figure 21. Third step of hiding process.

Part I Summary
Although one may quickly jump at the opportunity to label covert non-electronic
networks (CNN) and covert non-electronic networks combined with cryptography
[CNN(C)] as primitive, obsolete, and perhaps fantasies of the imagination, one should
note that covert non-electronic communication methods can often provide for an overall
effective battlefield strategy. Secret human networks comprising of unique nonelectronic communication methods can be extremely difficult to detect or observe if no
prior knowledge is given beforehand regarding these network components. These covert
non-electronic methods, which can include drops, courier routes, drivers, cryptography,
and steganography, can at times be very abstract and unyielding to those who wish to
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observe or disrupt. Therefore, CNN and CNN(C) must be taken very seriously by
intelligence services across the globe. Perhaps too much emphasis has been focused on
electronic surveillance and the assumption that people will follow normal communication
patterns. As for combatting such networks, one must pay close attention to the individual
features of a particular network and always be prepared to encounter an unexpected
complexity, whether it be in regards to mathematics, intelligence, language, or culture.
For more information on a real life example of a CNN, search how the C.I.A. was able to
discover Osama bin Laden’s compound by tracking one of his couriers.
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PART II
Covert Electronic Networks and Arabic Cryptology Applications
The reality is that cybercrime is happening internationally among
organized criminal groups, corporations, and governments, as well as
at the individual hacker level. Besides simply communicating about
their various activities, one of the most frequent uses of the Internet
by organized crime and terrorists alike is to launder money, which
involves secret communication about that money as well as financial
transactions that move it from account to account. The Internet
provides the perfect climate for criminals for several reasons. It’s fast,
it’s anonymous, it’s unregulated. (Cole, 2003, p. 93)
Now that one has seen how the art of hand-to-hand secret communication works,
or as more recently stated, covert non-electronic networks, our attention will now shift in
this part to more sophisticated covert networks involving modern day electronics.
Returning to the Iranian example in part I, suppose now that the American spy has been
given new orders to infiltrate an Iranian telecommunications company, called
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). The spy’s new orders state that he or she
must infiltrate TCI through electronic means only, since non-electronic methods are just
too dangerous at this particular point in time. More specifically, the spy is told that he or
she could possibly send an email containing a trojan horse to TCI, that when opened by
an unsuspecting employee, uses code to obtain access to pieces of TCI’s mobile services
infrastructure. Once access has been granted, the spy will then use his or her computer
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skills to locate the phone numbers and other important data of top Iranian government
officials. Some of the questions and concerns of this project might be: Is a trojan horse
the fastest and most efficient electronic method available to the spy to achieve his or her
goals? If not, what are some alternative computer/electronic schemes that could be used
instead? For instance, is there an insider at the company who would be willing to encrypt
the information and send it to the American spy with the corresponding encryption keys?
Could the spy possibly create a fake identity and trick a naïve employee into giving what
he or she wants over the phone? Obviously such methods must be compared beforehand
in terms of cost, time efficiency, and whether or not they place people or groups at risk or
exposure to harm.
In the context of spy tradecraft, this part will describe a variety of ways in which
two or more people can secretly communicate with one another with the support of
electronic devices and applications such as cell phones, email, Internet forums, instant
messaging, etc. These covert electronic communication methods can include the use
of contacts, electronic dead drops, specific computer terminal locations, cryptography,
and steganography. (Again, note that the word covert in this instance denotes an activity
that is “secret” to the controllers of communication, but in fact may be exposed to
outsiders.) These covert electronic communication methods can rely entirely upon
electronic devices/applications or they can depend upon both a combination of electronic
devices/applications with cryptographic schemes. When covert electronic
communication methods are systematically combined together, they ultimately form
covert electronic networks (CEN) or covert electronic networks combined with
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cryptography (CEN(C)). The main advantages of these types of secret networks are
that they are fast, affordable, and easy to use (sometimes). However, the benefits of such
networks can often be short lived. Disadvantages can include eavesdropping,
wiretapping, and cryptanalysis, all of which can go undetected or remain silent in the
background.
We include a few theoretical examples that demonstrate how in this age of hightech electronics and other things like easy access to the Internet, such networks can be
quickly formed without notice or detection by groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
jihadists, and other insurgents. This part will also present how these covert electronic
communication methods can be manipulated, expanded, and creatively altered by other
factors (e.g., abstract electronic steganography) to achieve an objective that is specific to
an individual covert network. In the future, it is these structural modifications that will
be of interest when categorizing CEN/CEN(C), and perhaps performing steganography
analysis or cryptanalysis on a particular CEN or CEN(C).
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CHAPTER 3: Covert Electronic Networks (CEN)
Today terrorist groups are on the cutting edge of technology. They use
computers, the Internet, encryption, and steganography to conduct
business. If their cryptography is good, it can take decades to crack.
If they use steganography, their transmission of data may go
completely undetected. (Cole, 2003, p. 8)
3.1 Covert electronic communication methods.
All data fields located under the data field of covert electronic communication
methods can be found in Figure 6. We have provided some descriptions of these data
fields below and how they relate to spy tradecraft.
An electronic courier or messenger, is a trusted individual who is sent an
electronic message by one party, and is expected to follow through by delivering the
message (by electronic means only) to a second party at a specified location. A covert
electronic network can consist of multiple digital couriers, destinations, and vested
parties. An electronic contact, on the other hand, is a person or clandestine meeting
between two parties over an electronic channel. An electronic dead drop is an electronic
depository or location where two parties agree to exchange secret information. An
example would be a computer file (Cole, 2003). Electronic steganography is the
electronic component of steganography, in which writing or text is hidden in an electronic
setting such as an image file, audio file, word document, etc. In order to save time we
only consider examples of covert electronic networks combined with steganography and
cryptography, which are provided in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: Covert Electronic Networks Combined with Cryptography [CEN(C)]
Unlike ordinary CEN, CEN(C) look to the field of cryptography to cleverly
disguise all electronic communications. For example, someone might choose to encrypt
a text message by using a designated cryptosystem and key before he or she sends it to a
contact. As for the cryptosystems involved, someone could choose from a variety of
cryptosystems such as: Hill cipher; transposition cipher; one-time pad; the Ron Rivest,
Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman algorithm (RSA); and Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES).
4.1 Real life examples of al-Qaeda encryption software: Mujahideen Secrets
ﻫﺪﻳﻦ
ِ ﺳﺮﺍﺭ ﺍُﳌﺠﺎ
ْ َﺃ.
An al-Qaeda affiliated group, called the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)

ﺳﻼِﻣَﻴﺔ ﺍﻟَﻌﺎﳌَﻴﺔ
ْ ﳉْﺒَﻬﺔ ﺍﻹﻋﻼِﻣَﻴﺔ ﺍﻹ, and an Islamic Web forum named the Islamic Faithful/
Devoted Network or al-Ekhlaas Islamic Network ﺳﻼِﻣَﻴﺔ
ْ ﺧﻼﺹ ﺍﻹ
ْ ﺷَﺒَﻜﺔ ﺍﻹ
َ , tried to use the
Internet to distribute encryption software for the purpose of sending and receiving secret
messages. Encrypted messages were exchanged using symmetric and asymmetric
encryption methods, such as AES and RSA algorithms, respectively. For more
information on symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques, see Trappe and
Washington (2006).
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) ﻣَﻴﺔ ﺍﻟَﻌﺎﳌَﻴﺔ
ِ ﺳﻼ
ْ ﺍﳉْﺒَﻬﺔ ﺍﻹﻋﻼِﻣَﻴﺔ ﺍﻹ.
The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) is a multi-media outlet, which is part of
al-Qaeda’s “public relations” effort. It spreads jihadi rhetoric and propaganda across
media sources such as the Internet, television, magazines, and text messages. Since the
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Internet is a relatively safe place to post controversial information, GIMF uses the
Internet as its primary source to distribute all types of jihad material. These materials
include short video clips of insurgent attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, first-person video
games, and downloadable software. According to www.globalsecurity.org, GIMF’s
sphere of influence across the Internet is primarily centered around the country of
Pakistan, which gives a good indication to where GIMF’s creators and maintainers
operate. One of GIMF’s most significant technical achievements in terms of computer
programming was the release of a free encryption tool called Mujahideen Secrets in 2007
(Danchev, 2008; Vijayan, 2008).
Mujahideen Secrets 1 (MS1) - ۱ ﻫﺪﻳﻦ
ِ ﺳﺮﺍﺭ ﺍُﳌﺠﺎ
ْ  َﺃ- first edition.
We refer to this version of Mujahideen Secrets as MS1 for clarity purposes. MS1
gives users the option and capability to encrypt email messages using either symmetric or
asymmetric encryption. The symmetric, or private-key, encryption process uses AES
algorithms with a Rijndael block length of 256 bits, while the asymmetric, or public-key,
encryption process uses RSA algorithms with a 2048-bit length (Danchev, 2008). Some
other features of MS1 are listed below.
MS1 Features (Danchev, 2008):
• Uses the best five cryptographic algorithms in cryptography (AES finalist
algorithms)
• Ultra strong symmetric encryption
• Pressure data ROM (the highest levels of pressure)
• Keys and encryption algorithms with ghost changing technology (stealthy
cipher)
• Automatic identification decryption algorithm (cipher auto-detection)
• Program consisting of one facility file - does not need assistance to install and
can run from portable memory
61

•

Files can be erased without the possibility of retrieving the files (file shredder)

Islamic Faithful/Devoted Network or Al-Ekhlaas Islamic Network ﻜﺔ
َ ﺷَﺒ
َ

ﺳﻼِﻣَﻴﺔ
ْ ﺧﻼ ﺹ ﺍ ﻹ
ْ ﺍ ﻹ.
The Islamic Faithful Network, or al-Ekhlaas, was a popular U.S. based Islamic
Web forum created by a man named Peterson Hoffman on January 22, 2006, in Amman,
Jordan (Altman, 2008). The website was first located on a server in Rochester,
Minnesota and was password protected (Henry (2008c)). In early January 2008, the site
released what is known as, Mujahideen Secrets 2 or MS2 (author’s abbreviation), the
second version of Mujahideen Secrets (MS1). MS2 was discovered by J.M. Berger, a
Cambridge, Massachusetts-based freelance journalist and documentary film-maker who
specializes in terrorism (Techworld Staff, 2008). Shortly after MS2’s release, al-Ekhlaas
was “arguably the single most important al’Qaeda Web site in operation” with an
estimated 17 million total visits (Altman, 2008). The website then moved to a server in
Tampa, Florida, which was owned by a company called Noc4hosts, Inc. Once
Noc4hosts, Inc. received word of jihad activity from authorities and computer security
experts, the company quickly disabled and removed the site. After the site’s second
shutdown, it moved again to a server in Phoenix, Arizona where it was removed for a
third time (Techworld Staff, 2008). It is unclear as to why GIMF released MS1, but did
not release MS2.
Mujahideen Secrets 2 (MS2) - ۲ ﻫﺪﻳﻦ
ِ ﺳﺮﺍﺭ ﺍُﳌﺠﺎ
ْ  َﺃ- second edition.
Like its predecessor, MS2 could be downloaded for free and created a lot of
chatter on the Internet among jihadists. In addition, both MS1 and MS2 allow users to
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type Arabic script, as opposed to transliterated Arabic, which is often used on non-Arabic
compatible devices and applications such as cell phones and instant messaging. For
example, the Arabic word ﺳﺮﺍﺭ
ْ َﺃ, meaning secrets, is pronounced “asraar”, therefore its
English transliteration, keystroke, or typed equivalent is “asraar.”
MS2 is an extension of MS1 and provides a number of new applications and
features, which have been integrated into the older software. Some of these new
applications and features include increased portability and RSA security, the production
of digital signatures, and the ability to encrypt Yahoo and MSN instant messages
(Techworld Staff, 2008). The increase of MS2’s portability makes it easier to distribute
the software via a USB device for example. Below is a complete list of all new features
offered by MS2.
MS2 Features (Danchev, 2008):
• Multicast encrypted via text messages supporting the immediate use forums
(Secure Messaging)
• Transfer files of all kinds to be shared across text forums (Files to Text
Encoding)
• Production of digital signatures
• Digital signatures of messages and files for authenticity
• Upgraded graphical user interface
• Improved RSA security encryption codes in order to handle functions such as
key generation and key management
According to Paul Henry (2008a), MS2 also has, “the ability to take a binary file
and encrypt it in such a way that the file can be posted in a pure ASCII or text-only
format.” Moreover, “as a result, individuals could use MS2 to encrypt files and post
them on sites that aren’t even on the Internet - for instance, on a telephone-accessed
bulletin board system” (Techworld Staff, 2008). Additionally, MS2 is well-written,
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harder to crack than MS1, and has fewer coding mistakes (Henry, 2008a). The files also
have a unique fingerprint, which can be used for tracking (Henry, 2008a).
It seems that all websites offering the encryption tools MS1 and MS2 have been
currently disabled. According to Paul Henry (2008b), the codes for MS1 were broken by
law enforcement authorities. It is unclear whether MS2 codes have been broken. The
purpose behind al-Qaeda’s creation of both MS1 and MS2 is not difficult to explain; alQaeda members desire a possible means of communicating with one another without
exposing their plans of warfare to authorities. More specifically, the software was
created, “in order to support the Mujahideen in general and the Islamic State in Iraq in
particular” (Reuters Group, 2008). However, there is also a subtle purpose to the creation
of the software from a technical standpoint. One computer security expert states that, “alQaeda supporters are building their own encryption tools because they are concerned that
industry built and public encryption software contain back doors” (Henry, 2008c).
Therefore, it is not far fetched to say that al-Qaeda is trying to adapt to the technological
complexities of today’s world in order to stay active and covert.
4.2 Examples of CEN(C).
Hill cipher: Discussion.
The Hill cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example parallels the
same Hill cipher technique found in Trappe and Washington (2006). However, this
particular Hill cipher uses Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) as well as the author’s own
set of numerical values.
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Iraq - Ibrahim would like to text message his friend Yassin (who lives in Yemen)
to tell him about some discussions that took place last week among some key members of
their political party. Ibrahim knows that Yassin will relay this information to other
members in the Yemen faction. Ibrahim, however, is afraid that the text message will be
intercepted by some members of an opposing party, so he decides to encrypt his message
using the Hill cipher.
Ibrahim’s message m is,

ﺟﺮﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺳﺒﻮﻉ ﺍﳌﺎﺿﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﺩﺛﺎﺕ ﻫﺎّﻣﺔ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
Important discussions took place last week.
For the Hill cipher, Ibrahim chooses an n x n matrix M for a key whose entries are
integers mod 36 and gcd(det(M), 36) = 1. Ibrahim chooses the matrix,
3
M = 16

14 27
4

17

10 33

3

such that n = 3. Ibrahim then checks if M is invertible modulo 36. If M is invertible mod
36, then Ibrahim knows that his friend Yassin will be able to decrypt the ciphertext into
the original plaintext. In order to do this, Ibrahim computes det(M) ≡ 13237 (mod 36) ≡
25 and checks if gcd(det(M), 36) = gcd(25, 36) = 1. Therefore, Ibrahim knows that there
exists an inverse N such that MN ≡ I (mod 36), where I is the identity matrix.
It follows that the inverse of M is,
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-549 849

130

(1/13237) 122 -261 381
488

41

-549 849
(1/25)

-212

130

122 -261 381
488

41

-212
-1

Here, (13237) mod 36 ≡ 25. Also, Ibrahim replaces (1/25) or 25 with 13, since 13 is the
inverse of 25 mod 36. Therefore, after multiplying each entry above by the scalar 13, in
addition to reducing each entry by modulo 36, Ibrahim gets,

N≡

27

21

34

2

27

21

8

29

16

Ibrahim now checks that,

MN ≡

3

14

27

27

21

34

16

4

17

2

27

21

10 33

3

8

29

16

≡ I (mod 36)

To encrypt his message, Ibrahim decomposes his message m into a series of row
vectors of length n and multiplies each row vector by matrix M on the right. The entries
of the row vectors are read right to left.
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Figure 22. Hill cipher encryption.

v5
ﺍﻝﻡ

v4
ﺏ ﻭﻉ

v3
ﻝ ﺍﺱ

v2
ﻑﻱﺍ

v1
ﺝﺭﺕ

(23, 22, 0)
(25, 14, 23)

(17, 26, 1)
(9, 15, 4)

(11, 0, 22)
(1, 16, 3)

(0, 27, 19)
(10, 15, 12)

(2, 9, 4)
(10, 16, 3)

(vi M) mod 36

ﻡﺽﻩ

ﺝﻁﺭ

ﺙﻅﺏ

ﺵﻁﺯ

ﺙﻅﺯ

ciphertext

v10
ﻡﺓﺍ

v9
ﺕﻩﺍ

v8
ﺩﺙﺍ

v7
ﻡﺡﺍ

v6
ﺍﺽﻱ

plaintext

(0, 3, 7)
(10, 27, 0)

(0, 5, 23)
(22, 23, 10)

(27, 14, 0)
(17, 2, 31)

(vi M) mod 36

ﺍﻱﺯ

ﺯﻡﻝ

ﺀﺕﻉ

ciphertext

(0, 34, 23)
(0, 25, 2)
(18, 31, 35) (24, 22, 35)

ﺅﺀﻍ

ﺅﻝﻥ

plaintext

vi

vi

ciphertext,

ﺙﻅﺯﺵﻁﺯﺙﻅﺏﺝﻁﺭﻡﺽﻩﺀﺕﻉﺯﻡﻝﺍﻱﺯﺅﻝﻥﺅﺀﻍ
Sitting in a café, Ibrahim sends the matrix key directly to Yassin in Yemen using
his computer. Ibrahim then sends the ciphtertext separately as a cell phone text message
to his friend Alliya who lives in Saudi Arabia. Alliya then relays this text message on his
cell phone to his friend Fadil in Saudi Arabia. Once again, Fadil texts this ciphertext to
another person in Saudi Arabic who ultimately text messages it to Yassin in Yemen.
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Figure 23. The discussion network.

loc5

loc4
loc1
loc3

loc2

Location 2 Data Fields

Location 1 Data Fields
•

•
•

Location (country - Iraq, town/
place - unknown, description - in
a café)
Persons of interest (Ibrahim friend to Alliya and Yassin)
Covert electronic communication
methods (description - electronics
available, hardware - cell phone
and computer, cryptography - Hill
cipher - Ibrahim sends matrix key
directly to Yassin in Yemen using
his computer, Ibrahim then sends
the ciphertext separately in a text
message to his friend Alliya in
Saudi Arabia)
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•

•
•

Location (country - Saudi Arabia,
town/place - unknown,
description - none)
Persons of interest (Alliya Ibrahim’s friend)
Covert electronic communication
methods (hardware - cell phone,
cryptography - receiver of Hill
cipher text message ciphertext
from Ibrahim, Alliya then text
messages the ciphertext to his
friend Fadil in Saudi Arabia)

Location 4 Data Fields

Location 3 Data Fields
•

•
•

Location (country - Saudi Arabia,
town/place - unknown,
description - none)
Persons of interest (Fadil - friend
of Alliya)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(description - electronics
available, hardware - cell phone,
cryptography - receives the Hill
cipher ciphertext from Alliya and
text messages it to an unknown
friend in Saudi Arabia)

Location 5 Data Fields
•

•
•

Location (country - Yemen,
description - large city located
near the harbors, place unknown)
Persons of interest (Yassin friend to Ibrahim)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(hardware - cell phone and
computer, cryptography - receives
the Hill cipher key on his
computer from Ibrahim, receives
the ciphertext from an unknown
person via text message)
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•

•

•

Location (country - Saudi Arabia,
town/place - unknown,
description - none)
Persons of interest (person unknown, friend to Fadil and
Yassin)
Covert non-electronic
communication methods
(description - electronics
available, hardware - cell phone,
cryptography - receives the Hill
cipher ciphertext from Fadil and
text messages it to Yassin in
Yemen)

In practice, the size of n for Ibrahim’s original n x n key matrix M may in fact be
considerably larger, thus requiring more computational power for calculations. A
powerful, yet affordable computer program such as MATLAB, may be used as a quick
and efficient supplement for tedious hand calculations involving modular arithmetic and
inverses of matrices.
Transposition cipher: The Yemeni camp.
The transposition cipher is a classical cryptosystem and the following example
parallels the same transposition cipher technique described in Menezes et al. (1997).
However, this cipher uses MSA as well as this author’s own set of numerical values.
Note, the term transposition is synonymous with the term permutation.
Yemen - Yassin has been told by his superiors that he must report back to Ibrahim
about the movement of troops in a particular Yemini camp over the last three months. In
addition, he must describe how many troops are attending the camp and where they are
coming from. Yassin gathers this information from a few of his sources and composes
his message.
Yassin’s message m is,

ﻳﺼﻞ ﺍﳌﻌﺴﻜﺮ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻨﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻳﻮﻡ ﻋﺪﺩ ﻛﺒﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﻘﺎﺗﻠﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺩﺍﺧﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻼﺩ ﻭ ﺧﺎﺭﺟﻬﺎ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):

Every day the Yemeni camp receives a large number of fighters from within and from
outside the country.
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Yassin encrypts his message using the transposition cipher. For the transposition
cipher, Yassin considers a finite set S = {k, . . . , 3, 2, 1}, where k represents the
cardinality of S. The elements of the set S are listed in decreasing order because Arabic
is read right to left. Yassin chooses length k = 5, therefore S = {5, 4, 3, 2, 1}. Yassin then
selects a permutation of S as the key; for example, the permutation given by,
p(5) = 2, p(4) = 1, p(3) = 5, p(2) = 3, p(1) = 4

p=

-1

p =

5

4

3

2

1

2

1

5

3

4

5

4

3

2

1

3

1

2

5

4

Figure 24. Transposition cipher encryption.
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ﻝ
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ciphertext:

ﻱ

ﺍ

ﻝ

ﻥ

ﻡ

ﺱ

ﻡ

ﻉ

ﺭ

ﻙ

ﻝ

ﻱ

ﺹ

ﻝ

ﺍ

ﺭ

ﺏ

ﻱ

ﻥ

ﻡ

ﺩ

ﻡ

ﻉ

ﻙ

ﺩ

ﻝ

ﻱ

ﻙ

ﻭ

ﻱ

ﺍ

ﻥ

ﺩ

ﻝ

ﺥ

ﻱ

ﺕ

ﻝ

ﻡ

ﻥ

ﻡ

ﺍ

ﻝ

ﺍ

ﻕ

ﺍ

ﺝ

ﻩ

ﺉ

ﺉ

ﺥ

ﺩ

ﻭ

ﺭ

ﺍ

ﺏ

ﺍ

ﻝ

ﺍ

ﻝ

Yassin sends his encrypted message over his cell phone and tells his friend to send the
key to Ibrahim in a particular Internet chat room.
One-time pad: A sensitive conversation.
The one-time pad is a classical cryptosystem and the following example parallels
the same one-time pad cipher technique found in Trappe and Washington (2006).
However, this cipher uses MSA as well as the author’s own set of numerical values. The
term one-time pad is synonymous with the term Vernam cipher.
Iraq - Yassin and Ibrahim are just finishing up a conversation on what type of
design they would like to incorporate into the flag of their political party. They know that
the design of their new flag could cause unrest and stir hatred among other opposing
parties and for this reason, Yassin and Ibrahim decide to encrypt their messages using a
series of one-time pads.
Ibrahim’s last message m to Yassin is,

 ﺃﻧﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ ﺃﻥ ﻧﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﺑﺤﺚ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻏﺪﺍ؟.ﺷﻜﺮﺍ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
Thanks. Can we continue the discussion of the flag tomorrow?
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For the one-time pad, Ibrahim converts his Arabic message m into binary or a
string of 1s and 0s, whereby the binary version of m is also read right to left. In order to
do this, Ibrahim assigns a unique sequence of one or more bits, called a bitstring, to each
letter of MSA and to any other symbol he wishes to encrypt. In this case, Ibrahim
7

chooses bit string combinations of length seven. This will allow Ibrahim to assign 2 =
128 possible bitstring combinations to different text values. Once this has been done,
Ibrahim creates what is known as a look-up table, which is a written or an electronic
document used by two or more network parties during the coding and decoding process,
to convert all textual characters to their respective numerical values, and vice-versa. In
this case, the numerical values are bitstrings. This means that Ibrahim will somehow
have to physically send or electronically communicate an identical copy of his look-up
table to Yassin before Yassin is able to successfully convert the binary plaintext back into
ordinary text. Yassin will also need a key in this case since they are using one-time pads.
Ibrahim and Yassin’s binary look-up table for MSA and a few other symbols is provided
below.

Figure 25. Random binary representations.

ﺍ

0101000

ﻍ

1000011

ﺏ

0110000

ﻑ

0100100

ﺕ

0111000

ﻕ

0101100

ﺙ

1000000

ﻙ

0110100

ﺝ

0100001

ﻝ

0111100

ﺡ

0101001

ﻡ

1000100
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ﺥ

0110001

ﻥ

0100101

ﺩ

0111001

ﻩ

0101101

ﺫ

1000001

ﻭ

0110101

ﺭ

0100010

ﻱ

0111101

ﺯ

0101010

ﺃ

1000101

ﺱ

0110010

ﺇ

0100110

ﺵ

0111010

ﺁ

0101110

ﺹ

1000010

ﺀ

0110110

ﺽ

0100011

ﺉ

0111110

ﻁ

0101011

ﻯ

1000110

ﻅ

0110011

ﺓ

0100111

ﻉ

0111011

ﺅ

0101111

.
؟

0110111
0111111

Having converted his message m to a binary string, Ibrahim then generates a
random string of binary with length equivalent to m for the key. For simplicity
concerning hand calculations, Ibrahim assumes that the binary key for his message is
random. Ibrahim then performs the bit operation bitwise exclusive or, frequently
denoted XOR, on the two strings. This bit operation is provided in detail in the table
below.

Exclusive Or/XOR
x
0
0
1
1

y
0
1
0
1
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x⊕y
0
1
1
0

Note that XOR is the same as adding corresponding bits mod 2, therefore Ibrahim
writes the key directly below the message and adds them together mod 2. The result is a
binary string of ciphertext. This bit operation can be performed even faster with a
computer.

Figure 26. One-time pad encryption.

.

ﺍ

ﺭ

ﻙ

ﺵ

plaintext

0110111
1011100
1101011

0101000
0011011
0110011

0100010
1101011
1001001

0110100
1111000
1001100

0111010
1000111
1111101

binary
key
ciphertext

ﻁ

ﺕ

ﺱ

ﻥ

ﺃ

plaintext

0101011
0110111
0011100

0111000
1111110
1000110

0110010
0000100
0110110

0100101
0000011
0100110

1000101
0010101
1010000

binary
key
ciphertext

ﻥ

ﻥ

ﺃ

ﻉ

ﻱ

plaintext

0100101
0000001
0100100

0100101
0110001
0010100

1000101
1010111
0010010

0111011
0111000
0000011

0111101
0011001
0100100

binary
key
ciphertext

ﺏ

ﻉ

ﺏ

ﺍ

ﺕ

plaintext

0110000
1110111
1000111

0111011
0101110
0010101

0110000
0000111
0110111

0101000
1101111
1000111

0111000
0000101
0111101

binary
key
ciphertext

ﻉ

ﻝ

ﺍ

ﺙ

ﺡ

plaintext

0111011
0010010
0101001

0111100
0010101
0101001

0101000
1111111
1010111

1000000
0011100
1011100

0101001
0000110
0101111

binary
key
ciphertext

ﺍ

ﺩ

ﻍ

ﻡ

ﻝ

plaintext

0101000
0101010
0000010

0111001
1110110
1001111

1000011
0001110
1001101

1000100
0000000
1000100

0111100
1110110
1001010

binary
key
ciphertext

75

؟

plaintext

0111111
0111101
0000010

binary
key
ciphertext

ciphertext:
1101011 0110011 1001001 1001100 1111101
0011100 1000110 0110110 0100110 1010000
0100100 0010100 0010010 0000011 0100100
1000111 0010101 0110111 1000111 0111101
0101001 0101001 1010111 1011100 0101111
0000010 1001111 1001101 1000100 1001010
0000010
The task of assigning letters different bitstrings is similar to substitution in the
sense that in substitution, one assigns different integer values to the letters of the
alphabet. Look-up tables, in general, do not always have to contain numerical values
assigned to respective text characters. That is to say, one may also substitute entire words
with numerical or text values. Such a table is called a dictionary look-up table.
Given that a particular one-time pad is unbreakable, it may be possible for
authorities to record keystrokes or use computer forensics software to retrieve unknown
keys.
Audio steganography: The call to prayer.
Yemen - Yassin would like to send a one-time pad cipher (on p. 76) using
steganography to his friend Ibrahim who is living in Iraq. Yassin will send the key for the
one-time pad at a later date in the mail to Ibrahim disguised as a series of barcodes on
some new pirated DVDs (see p. 76 for the key; also pirated DVDs and pirated DVD
covers are very common in the Middle East and North Africa and can usually be bought
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on the street for about one American dollar). Yassin decides to use a freeware
steganography CD-ROM program that accompanies the book Hiding In Plain Sight
(Cole, 2003) to embed the cipher into an audio file, or more specifically, a WAV song file.
Steps 1-9 show the process of how Yassin accomplishes this task.
Step 1.
Yassin installs the main steganography program, called stego, from the Hiding In
Plain Sight CD-ROM onto his computer. Yassin will run routines 9 and 10 from the
stego program on the command-line prompt for the encoding and decoding processes,
respectively. Routine 9 is called WAV Twiddle encode and routine 10 is called WAV
Twiddle decode.
Step 2.
Before running routines 9 and 10, Yassin uses the Internet to download a free
MP3 Muslim prayer song, Call to prayer in Jakarta (djbacon, 2004), from Masjid
Baiturrahman Bintaro, a mosque located in Jakarta, Indonesia. He then converts his MP3
prayer song to a WAV file, since the steganography program only works with WAV files.
This song is saved as Masjid_Baiturrahman_Bintaro_Jakarta_0.wav (this may be done
with any freeware MP3 WAV converter available on the Internet). To start the encoding
process, Yassin writes and saves his one-time pad into a .txt file called covert.txt.
Step 3.
Yassin saves the covert.txt file, the song .wav file
Masjid_Baiturrahman_Bintaro_Jakarta_0.wav, and the stego application or program in
the file called StegoTwiddle.
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Step 4.
Yassin runs routine 9 to encode or embed his one-time pad message in the
covert.txt file into the new .wav file called new_song_twiddle.wav. This new song file
will contain Yassin’s covert.txt message and will sound identical to the original song.
That is, the tampering of the sound of this new song with the added covert.txt data will be
indiscernible to the human ear.
Step 5.
The new song (new_song_twiddle) containing the hidden message can now be
found in the StegoTwiddle file.
Step 6.
Yassin checks that he can extract the covert.txt data from the new song by running
routine 10. This will ensure that Ibrahim will be able to successfully extract or decode
the covert.txt from the new song. In order to accomplish this task, Yassin must create a
new .txt file called covert.decoded.twiddle.txt. This new file will receive the covert.txt
data from the new song during the extraction process and not the actual covert.txt file.
Step 7.
The covert.decoded.twiddle.txt file can now be found in the StegoTwiddle folder.
Step 8.
Opening the new covert.decoded.twiddle.txt file reveals the original message or
one-time pad.
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Step 9.
A comparison of the two songs in a Hex Editor program reveals that the two
songs are in fact different. This proves that the new song contains the original covert.txt
message.

Figure 27. Hex editor: Song comparison.
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Step 10.
Yassin sends a box of new pirated DVDs to Ibrahim in the mail with barcodes
containing sections of the key of the one-time pad. The last two digits of the barcodes
reveal the order in which they must be placed to form the original key.
RSA: The harbor.
The following RSA algorithm parallels the same RSA algorithm found in Trappe
and Washington (2006). However, this RSA example uses MSA as well as this author’s
own set of numerical values.
Iraq - Ibrahim has informed Yassin that he has discovered a new and more secure
way to encrypt their messages online using a public key cryptosystem called the RSA
algorithm. For the RSA algorithm, Ibrahim follows four simple preliminary steps:
Preliminary steps (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
i. Ibrahim chooses two distinct primes, say p = 4789 and q = 2971, and computes
their product.
n = pq = 14228119
Ibrahim keeps these two distinct primes secret, since their relationship uniquely
determines the procedures of encryption and decryption conducted by Yassin and
Ibrahim, respectively.
ii. Next, Ibrahim computes φ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = (4788)(2970) = 14220360 and
selects an encryption exponent e such that e and φ(n) are relatively prime. In order for e
and φ(n) to be relatively prime, gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1. Ibrahim chooses e = 7657117 and
checks that gcd(7657117, 14220360) = 1 using the Euclidean algorithm. For the
Euclidean algorithm, Ibrahim divides the larger of the two numbers by the other number
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to give a quotient q1 and a remainder r1. Ibrahim assumes φ(n) is greater than e. This is
written as φ(n) = q1 ⋅ e + r1. Here, if e perfectly divides φ(n), then of course r1 = 0. If
φ(n) > 0 and e = 0, then q1 = 0 and r1 = 0. Ibrahim assumes that neither φ(n) or e is
equal to zero. If r1 ≠ 0, then the remainder r1 is clearly able to divide the number e from
the original expression φ(n) = q1 ⋅ e + r1, such that there exists a new quotient q2 and a
new remainder r2. This is due to the fact that r1 < e, whereby r1 is indeed the remainder
of φ(n) divided by e. By continuation of this quotient and remainder process, the
expression for the smaller number e is similarly written as e = q2 ⋅ r1 + r2. The next
expression for r1 is given by r1 = q3 ⋅ r2 + r3. This process is continued until a remainder
of zero is achieved. Ibrahim’s Euclidean algorithm calculations are given below:
14220360 = 1 ⋅ 7657117 + 6563243
7657117 = 1 ⋅ 6563243 + 1093874
6563243 = 5 ⋅ 1093874 + 1093873
1093874 = 1 ⋅ 1093873 + 1
1093873 = 1093873 ⋅ 1 + 0
Note that the last nonzero remainder is the greatest common divisor.
iii. Ibrahim then computes d such that de ≡ 1(mod (p - 1)(q - 1)) ≡ 1(mod φ(n)), [d
is the inverse of e modulo φ(n)], using the Extended Euclidean algorithm. Since e =
7657117 and φ(n) = 14220360 are relatively prime, there exists integers x and y such
that,
ex + φ(n)y = gcd(x, y) = 1

For the Extended Euclidean algorithm, Ibrahim sets x0 = 0, x1 = 1,
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and defines xj = - qj - 1 xj - 1 + xj - 2 for 1 ≤ qi ≤ n, where qi are the quotients found in the
Euclidean algorithm:
exn + φ(n)yn = gcd(a, b) = 1
The quotients from the Euclidean algorithm in ii. are q1 = 1, q2 = 1, q3 = 5, q4 = 1, q5 = 1
(from top to bottom).
Setting x0 = 0, x1 = 1, Ibrahim gets,
x2 = - 1x1 + x0 = - 1
x3 = - 1x2 + x1 = 2
x4 = - 5x3 + x2 = - 11
x5 = - 1x4 + x3 = 13
Ibrahim now knows that exn + φ(n)yn = 7657117 ⋅ x5 + 14220360 ⋅ y5 = gcd(x5, y5) = 1,
such that x5 = 13. Therefore, Ibrahim shows that d = 13 is the inverse of e modulo φ(n),
7657117 ⋅ x5 + 14220360 ⋅ y5 = 1
7657117 ⋅ 13 + 14220360 ⋅ y5 = 1
(7657117 ⋅ 13 + 14220360 ⋅ y5) (mod 14220360) ≡ 1(mod 14220360)
7657117 ⋅ 13 ≡ 1(mod 14220360)
Hence, 7657117d ≡ 1(mod 14220360), where d ≡ 13 (mod 14220360).
iv. Ibrahim keeps his private key, (p, q, d) = (4789, 2971, 13), secret and sends
his public key, (e, n) = (7657117, 14228119), to Yassin in Yemen.
Encryption (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Yemen - Yassin and his friend Yusef have just returned from a small trip to the
docks of one of the city’s many harbors. During their trip, they met with an old man who
showed them an inexpensive piece of real estate near the waterfront. Eager to report back
to Ibrahim about his trip, Yassin sits down at his computer and downloads Ibrahim’s
public key, (e, n) = (7657117, 14228119). He then types the following MSA message.
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Yassin’s message m,

 ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ.ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﳌﻴﻨﺎﺀ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﺒﺎﺡ
translation (Abboud & McCarus, 1983):
We went with him to the harbor in the morning. There is nothing.

To encrypt his message m using the RSA algorithm, Yassin uses the formula,
e

c ≡ m (mod n)
7657117

c≡m

(mod 14228119)

1. First labeling attempt.
Next, in order to represent his message m in numeric form, Yassin labels the MSA
alphabet and its special characters using the numeric values given below.

ﺍ ﺏ ﺕ ﺙ ﺝ ﺡ ﺥ ﺩ ﺫ ﺭ ﺯ ﺱﺵﺹﺽ ﻁ ﻅ ﻉ ﻍ ﻑ ﻕ ﻙ ﻝ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩ ﻭ ﻱ
27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

ﺅ

ﺀ ﺉ ﻯ ﺓ

ﺁ

ﺇ

ﺃ

35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28

Yassin, however, notices that the word “  ” ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎfrom his message loses the final character
“  ” ﺍduring encryption because its value is zero. This is shown below.
1st labeling attempt trial

ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ

0241258
7657117

c ≡ _241258

(mod 14228119)
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7657117

c≡m

(mod 14228119)

2. Second labeling attempt.
To solve this problem, Yassin relabels the MSA Alphabet and its special
characters starting at one.

ﺍ ﺏ ﺕ ﺙ ﺝ ﺡ ﺥ ﺩ ﺫ ﺭ ﺯ ﺱﺵﺹﺽ ﻁ ﻅ ﻉ ﻍ ﻑ ﻕ ﻙ ﻝ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩ ﻭ ﻱ
28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ﺅ

ﺀ ﺉ ﻯ ﺓ

ﺁ

ﺇ

ﺃ

36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29

This time, Yassin notices that although he solves the problem of the disappearing “ ” ﺍ,
from the word “ ” ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ, another phrase from his message containing the same number of
characters with an “ ” ﺍ, namely the phrase “ ” ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ, appears to have a different number
of digits during encryption. Yassin suspects that this will cause future encryption and
decryption problems.
2nd labeling attempt trial

ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ

1252269
7657117

c ≡ 1252269

(mod 14228119)

7657117

c≡m

ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ

322813123
7657117

c ≡ 322813123

(mod 14228119)

(mod 14228119)

7657117

c≡m

(mod 14228119)

3. Third labeling attempt.
To solve this problem, Yassin pads the first nine digits with zeros.
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ﺍ ﺏ ﺕ ﺙ ﺝ ﺡ ﺥ ﺩ ﺫ ﺭ ﺯ ﺱﺵﺹﺽ ﻁ ﻅ ﻉ ﻍ ﻑ ﻕ ﻙ ﻝ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩ ﻭ ﻱ
28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01

ﺅ

ﺀ ﺉ ﻯ ﺓ

ﺁ

ﺇ

ﺃ

36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29

This time, however, Yassin notices that he again has the problem of a disappearing digit
resulting from the character “  ” ﺍfor the word “ ” ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ. This is due to the fact that
Arabic is read right to left. The “  ” ﺍcharacter remains, but one of its digits is lost during
encryption. Likewise, the loss of a zero digit occurs for the next eight padded characters.
3rd labeling attempt trial

ﺫﻫﺒﻨﺎ

0125022609
7657117

c ≡ _125022609

(mod 14228119)

7657117

c≡m

ﻻ ﺷﻲﺀ

3228130123
7657117

c ≡ 3228130123

(mod 14228119)

(mod 14228119)

7657117

c≡m

(mod 14228119)

4. Fourth labeling attempt.
To solve the problems of disappearing digits and equal digit length, Yassin starts
by labeling the alphabet with the number 11.

ﺍ ﺏ ﺕ ﺙ ﺝ ﺡ ﺥ ﺩ ﺫ ﺭ ﺯ ﺱﺵﺹﺽ ﻁ ﻅ ﻉ ﻍ ﻑ ﻕ ﻙ ﻝ ﻡ ﻥ ﻩ ﻭ ﻱ
38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
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ﺅ

ﺀ ﺉ ﻯ ﺓ

ﺁ

ﺇ

ﺃ

46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39
To simplify his calculations, Yassin groups three consecutive letters at a time from
his original message m to form equal number blocks of length six. He then uses the RSA
encryption formula to encrypt each block separately. This process is given by the revised
RSA block encryption formula,
e

ci ≡ mi (mod n)
7657117

ci ≡ mi

(mod 14228119)

such that mi represents the numeric plaintext form of block i and ci represents the
corresponding ciphertext. The blocks are ordered from right to left.

Figure 28. RSA encryption.
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plaintext

2
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1
121135
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0
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4793407

i
mi
ci

ﺍﺀﻑ

ﻡﻱﻥ

ﻯﺍﻝ

plaintext

5
304211
13819400

4
353834
12083064

3
331144
12717422

i
mi
ci

ﺡﻝﺍ

ﺹﺏﺍ

ﻱﺍﻝ

plaintext

8
113316
11202703

7
111224
2013713

6
331138
9854143

i
mi
ci

ﺵﻱﺀ

plaintext

9
423823
2202791

i
mi
ci
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ciphertext:
6500748
13819400
11202703

1452031
12083064
2013713

4793407
12717422
9854143
2202791

Decryption (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Yassin and Yusef send the ciphertext in an email to Ibrahim, whereby Ibrahim decodes
each ciphertext block individually using his private key, (p, q, d) = (4789, 2971, 13), and
the RSA block decryption formula,
d

mi ≡ ci (mod n)
13

mi ≡ ci (mod 14228119)
d

The general RSA decryption formula without block notation is given by m ≡ c (mod n).
Ibrahim decrypts the first ciphertext block:
13

m0 ≡ c0 (mod 14228119)
13

m0 ≡ 4793407 (mod 14228119)
m0 ≡ 123619
The security of RSA rests in the fact that it is extremely difficult to factor large n.
Consequently, it is hard to correctly determine the decryption exponent d from the
formula de ≡ 1(mod (p - 1)(q - 1)), where (p - 1)(q - 1) = φ(n).
Applying cryptanalysis to the harbor.
We are given e = 7657117 and n = 14228119, since e and n were made public by
Ibrahim. Our goal is to factor n. In order to do accomplish this task, we need two
theorems and a definition.
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Theorem 1 (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).
Suppose p, q are primes such that q < p < 2q. Let n = pq and let 1 ≤ d, e < φ(n), whereby
φ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) and de ≡ 1(mod φ(n)). If d <

n1/4, then d can be found by quick

calculation in time that is polynomial in log n.
Proof (Trappe & Washington, 2006).
Multiplying both sides of the inequality q < p by q we get,
q2 < pq
Since n = pq,
2

q <n
This means, q <
Now subtracting φ(n) from both sides of the equality n = pq we obtain,
n - φ(n) = pq - φ(n) = pq - (p - 1)(q - 1) = pq - pq + q + p - 1 = q + p - 1

(1)

Since p < 2q we know that,
q + p - 1 < q + 2q - 1 < 3q < 3

(2)

Now take ed = 1 + φ(n)k for some integer k ≥ 1, [there always exists an integer k ≥ 1
for ed = 1 + φ(n)k since d is the inverse e modulo φ(n)], then φ(n)k < 1 + φ(n)k.
Since e < φ(n) and considering the original assumption that d <

φ(n)k < ed < φ(n)d <
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φ(n) n

1/4

1/4

n

we get,

This shows that k <

1/4

n

.

Taking kn minus both sides of ed = 1 + φ(n)k and looking at both (1) and (2) in addition
to the result that k <

1/4

n

we get,

kn - ed = kn - (1 + φ(n)k)
= k(n - φ(n)) - 1 < k(n - φ(n)) < 3k

<

1/4

n

(3

3/4

)=n

We know that n - φ(n) > 1, since n - φ(n) = q + p - 1 with p > 1 and q > 1.
Now, since k ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ d, e < φ(n) < n, we know 1 < k(n - φ(n)), then clearly,
0 < k(n - φ(n)) - 1 and 0 < kn - ed.

Therefore, dividing 0 < kn - ed < n3/4 by dn in (3) and again considering the
original assumption that d <

1/4

n

The theorem states that if d <

we get,

n1/4, then d can be found by quick calculation in

time polynomial in log n. This statement is explored further below.
Definition: Continued fractions.
For every rational number,

, such that p and q are positive integers,

there exists a unique finite continued fraction representation given by,
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(3)

such that ai > 0 for i ≥ 1 and an > 1 [see Khinchin (1997) for restrictions on ai and
uniqueness related to the last element an]. Here, the set of numbers {a0; a1, a2, . . . , an}
are called the partial quotients of p/q (Weisstein, 2012). In the case that p and q are
positive integers, the partial quotients are always nonnegative integers. We will now see
how to obtain the finite continued fraction representation of
Using the floor function,
representation of the rational number

.

, define the finite continued fraction
by the following recurrence relation,

Set
= r0
then

where rn are called the remainders of x (Weisstein, 2012).
From the preceding recurrence relation we obtain,
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Given the finite continued fraction representation above, we can say

,

where cn is called the nth convergent (Weisstein, 2012).
Following the recurrence relation above, it can be shown that the rational number
pk/qk with the set of partial quotients {a0; a1, a2, . . . , ak} yields a closer
approximation to p/q than the rational number pj/qj with partial quotients
{a0; a1, a2, . . ., aj}, where 1≤ j < k.
A rational number pi/qi such that 1≤ i ≤ n is called the ith convergent.

It can also be shown that if

, then a0 = 0.

Theorem 2 (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).
For positive integers a, b, and the positive real number x if

then

,

.

Breaking RSA with continued fractions (from Trappe and Washington (2006)).
Looking at theorem 2, we can replace x by

. We can also replace a and b by

k and d, respectively.
Therefore, we have
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If

, then

.

Looking at theorem 1 we know that,

Then clearly from theorem 1,

By inserting the result found in theorem 1 into the conditional statement of theorem 2 we
get,

If

, then

.

This convergent is a direct result of the RSA algorithm’s implementation under the
Theorem 1’s conditions. Using this fact, we can follow five simple steps to factor n
(from Trappe and Washington (2006)):
1. Start by computing the finite continued fraction expansion of e/n.
2. Calculate convergent p1/q1.
3. Set k = p1 and d = q1 and compute h = (ed - 1)/k. The value h is a possible value for
φ(n) since ed = 1+ φ(n)k.
4. If h is not a integer, stop, repeat steps 2 and 3 for convergent p2/q2, p3/q3, and so on.
5. If h is an integer, find roots λ1, λ2 of the equation x2 - (n - h +1)x + n = 0. The
equation x2 - (n - φ(n) +1)x + n = (x - p)(x - q).
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Remember, we have intercepted Ibrahim’s public key which is given by (n, e) =
(14228119, 7657117). Furthermore, Ibrahim does not need to protect this key from other
people trying to steal/view it, since the security of RSA depends upon the private key and
the fact that it is hard to factor large n. We then follow steps 1 through 5 to factor n:
Step 1a.
Using the recurrence relation above we get,
Setting,

then

Proceeding in this manner, we obtain the partial quotients {0; 1, 1, 6, 19, 1, 433, 2, 62}.
Therefore, the finite continued fraction expansion of e/n is given by,
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Step 2a.
Convergent p1/q1 is given by 1/1, so we set p1 = k = 1 and q1 = d = 1 and
compute h = (ed - 1)/k.
h = (ed - 1)/k
h = (7657117 ⋅ 1 - 1)/1
h = 7657116
Step 3a.
Since h is an integer, we go to step 4.
Step 4a.
We must find roots λ1, λ2 of equation x2 - (n - h +1)x + n where h = 7657116.
The equation with h = 7657116,
x2 - (14228119 - 7657116 +1)x + 14228119 = 0
x2 - (6571004)x + 14228119 = 0

gives roots λ1 = - sqrt(10794509163885) + 3285502 and λ2 = sqrt(10794509163885) +
3285502, which of course are not integers, so we proceed to the next convergent.
Step 2b.
Convergent p2/q2 is given by 1/2, so we set k = 1 and d = 2. In fact, d cannot be equal to
an even number, since an even number modulo another even number cannot give a
remainder of 1. [This statement comes directly from Ibrahim’s original
equation 7657117d ≡ 1(mod 14220360)].
Step 2c.
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Convergent p3/q3 = 7/13, so set k = 7 and d = 13. Computing h we get,
h = (ed - 1)/k
h = (7657117 ⋅ 13 - 1)/7
h = 14220360
Step 3c.
Since h is an integer, we proceed to step 4.
Step 4c.
Again, we must find roots λ1, λ2 of the equation x2 - (n - h +1)x + n where h = 14220360.
This time we get,
x2 - (14228119 - 14220360 +1)x + 14228119 = 0
x2 - (7760)x + 14228119 = 0
where λ1 = 4789 and λ2 = 2971.
We have therefore factored n. We check that product of λ1 and λ2 is indeed equal to n.
n = (4789)(2971) = 14228119
We can now easily decode Yassin’s and Yusef’s cipher.
Part II Summary
For the sake of argument, if one removes the word “covert” from the term covert
electronic networks, then perhaps one is just left with “regular” electronic networks. If
so, then it is reasonable to conclude that regular electronic networks form the sea of
technology interaction which drives today’s modern world. For example, the number of
emails sent over the Internet everyday is enormous. Now inserting the word covert back
in, it is not hard to see why the total amount of information emanating from a covert
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electronic network, would only contribute to a small fraction of all daily electronic
information.
If covert electronic networks are truly malicious and criminal on the terrorist
level, then the scarcity of these networks, as well as their sometimes complex associated
attributes, such as cryptography and steganography, does not bode well for law
enforcement agencies. To combat such networks requires a deep understanding of how
individuals or organizations operate at the lowest level. For instance, how they relay
their data across different locations. This also goes for learning how individuals and
organizations use and adapt to today’s technology trends. In this respect and with
suggestion, law enforcement agencies must not only have the technical capacity to
uncover such networks, but they must also have the correct foresight and creative edge to
unlock the secrets of today’s covert electronic networks.
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Appendix A
Electronic Correspondence with J. Seberry (personal communication, May 8, 2011)
Dear Adam,
The data we gave in our book was incorrect. We tried to have this changed before
publication but it didn't happen.
There have been a few Saudi's interested in this but to my knowledge no better or newer
data has been published. Of course it may have been published in Arabic (or Hebrew).
I do not know of anything related to specific dialects and extrapolating from English
dialects I believe this could be a fruitful field of endeavour.
We originally looked extensively at Bahasa-Malaysia/Indonesia and Pin-yin
for Chinese but I don't have any more recent studies. We could distinguish between
classically encrypted Nordic languages.
Good researching
Jennifer Seberry
Professor of Computer Science
Foundation Professor, Centre for Computer and Information Security Research,
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong
Wollongong
NSW 2522, Australia

101

